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THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO PEACE IN
SIERRA LEONE:
THE ANALYSIS OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN A CIVIL WAR SITUATION
LAURENCE JUMA*
INTRODUCTION
The idea that perpetrators of human rights abuses should be made accountable
for their action has gained currency in international law and practice.' Nascent
from the general principles of human rights protection and state obligation decreed
by international instruments such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,2 the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 3 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 4 the idea has crystallized into an expanded scheme of action that calls for the avoidance of blanket
amnesties for past violations, imputation of individual criminal responsibility, and
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to try and punish human rights violators.' The argument that past violations may be excusable for reason of democratic
consolidation, for societal healing or for merely bringing the belligerents to a negotiation table is becoming unpopular even within nations that have experienced
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1. See generally Juan E. Mdndez, National Reconciliation, TransnationalJustice, and the International Criminal Court, 15 ETHICS AND INT'L AFF., 25 (2001); see also Kristin Henrad, The Viability
of National Amnesties in View of the IncreasingRecognition of Individual CriminalResponsibility at
InternationalLaw, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L., 595 (1999).
2. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter the Genocide Convention]. (recognizing individual criminal responsibility
for the crime of genocide). See also Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A
Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995).
3. See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, 1969 (primarily concerned with situations of armed conflict, it imports the
notion of punishment for "grave breaches" of international humanitarian law).
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 21 G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 21 at 52 [hereinafter ICCPR (adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered intoforce 23 Mar.
1976), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (requiring state parties "to ensure to all individuals" the enjoyment of
all rights recognized by the covenant). See also Juan Mdndez, Accountabilityfor Past Abuses, 19 HuM.
RTS. Q 255, 259 (1997) (interpreting the duty to "ensure" to mean the obligation to "take specific steps
to redress the wrong committed by each violation of a right").
5. Id.
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great political and social upheaval. 6 However, the development of appropriate enforcement mechanisms that would be in tandem with the unrelenting mood of the
international community against human rights violations has been very slow. 7 The
difficulty of marshalling the consensus necessary for treaty formation and the general political suspicion against the diminishing sovereignty privileges has impacted
negatively on such an enterprise. 8 The result has been a pathetic recourse to ad hoc
measures meant to bridge the gap between the genuine concerns for the eradication
of human rights abuses and the political desires to retain sovereignty and block interference with so called "internal affairs." 9
One area in which such a policy has become evident is with the prosecution
and punishment of war criminals through the ad hoc international war crimes tribunals.' The tribunals are a compromise between two competing forces - a creature of convenience crafted to satisfy the overwhelming demand for response
against massive violations of human rights, but with restricted temporal and substantive jurisdiction to match the cynicism of the western political influence." As
one scholar has observed:
The Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals were not established because of the United
Nations, or the powerful states that control it. They were not established because
of an intrinsic value on punishing war criminals or upholding the rule of law.
Rather, the mobilization of shame by non-governmental organizations and especially the grisly pictures beamed to the world by the television camera created2a
public relations nightmare and made liars of the centers of Western civilization.'
Because of the restrictions placed on them by their constitutive statutes, lack
of uniformity and the fact of their temporary presence, the tribunal's practical effect as a deterrent measure has been negligible - a fact conceded by even their most
ardent of supporters. 13 Despite this, the United Nations Security Council has persisted in this endeavor, making such tribunals the most preferred method of dealing
with international crimes and human rights abuses. 14 The Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals have thus created an enduring framework for a watered down international response to gross violations of human rights. 15 The Yugoslavia and Rwanda
tribunals have followed in this tradition and the proposed Sierra Leone tribu6. See Juan Mdndez, Latin American Experience of Accountability, in THE POLITICS OF
MEMORY: TRUTH HEALING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 127 (Ifi Amadiume & Abdullahi An-Na'im eds.,

2000).
7. See
8. See
9. See
10. See

id.
id.
id.
id.

11. See id.
12. Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167, 168 (1997).
13. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 50, (1998). See generally
Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 167, 169 (1995).
14. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at 277.
15. See JOHN R. CARTWRIGHT, POLITICS OF SIERRA LEONE 1947-67 156 (1970).
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nal/court may be no different. 16
Whereas the institution of war crimes tribunals in relatively "peaceful" times
has achieved some measure of "success," the viability of such schemes in the face
of an ongoing civil war, as well as their perceived incompatibility with peace processes, reveals a consistent contradiction in the implementation of international human rights law. 17 One reason could be the unpredictability of outcomes, given the
inherent weaknesses in the normative structure of the current web of international
human rights regimes.' 8 Obviously, these weaknesses are augmented by the incongruent policy objectives of the determinate authorities and by the exigencies of
international politics. 19 The other could be that the threat of punishment as an object of an international criminal process excites emotions and evokes fear amongst
warring parties, thereby diminishing any chances of seeking a negotiated solution
to a civil war.20 But perhaps what is germane to this discourse is whether the
propagation of these international schemes, especially those that investigate,
prosecute, and punish individuals responsible for international crimes, is consistent
with the overall objective of creating peace. While conceding that the punishment
of human rights violations is essential to the promotion of international peace and
security, 21 designing an appropriate mechanism for its enforcement, especially in
conditions of conflict, is a task that has received very scant normative attention.
However, one fact remains undisputed: for societies in turmoil, the promotion of
human rights as part and parcel of a holistic framework for peace, reconstruction,
and overall societal development presents a better opportunity for its enforcement
than the piecemeal approach favored by some powerful nations.
This article questions whether the establishment of a hybrid war crimes tribunal is an appropriate response to the current civil war in Sierra Leone. It analyzes
the Sierra Leone problem in the context of its historical evolution and draws the
conclusion that what is best for the country is an integrated program of action that
will address the peremptory factors inhibiting the maturation of the peace process.
Further, this article discounts the ad hoc interventionist programs propagated by
the UN and its collaborators upon their obvious inability to bring the war to an end,
bolster development of institutions of democracy, and eradicate violations of human rights abuses. 2 The article examines the relationship that exists between the
peace process and human rights so as to provide context to the discussion on the
nature of the proposed 'special international criminal court' now in the process of
being established in Sierra Leone.

16. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 156..
17. See id.
18. See id
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Preamble to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 74-75, adopted Nov., 26 1968, entered into
force Nov., 11 1970, reprinted in 8 ILM 68 (1969).
22. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 158.
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BACKGROUND TO THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

In 1961, Sierra Leone gained its independence from the British. 23 The dispensation of power was not immediately followed by elections, but rather adopted
the political structure that had been in place since the 1957 election.24 This created
tension between the powerful Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) led by Sir Milton
Magai, who, by virtue of being a majority leader in the colonial legislature, had
assumed the post of prime minister, and the bulwark of opposition leaders.25 This
was indeed a false start in the long path towards democratic self-governance. The
uneasiness generated by squabbling amongst political leaders and the fear that such
morose political atmosphere may erode public confidence in the government,
prompted Milton Magai to dissolve parliament on April 17, 1962 and to call for
general elections on May 25 of the same year.26 It was not surprising that the
mainstream political parties were unable to secure majority votes. 27 In fact, the independent candidates secured 42.6 percent of the votes against the SLPP 34.7 percent, All Peoples Congress (APC) 17.2 percent, Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement (SLPIM) 5.2 percent and UPP 0.3 percent; SLPP was,
however, allowed to form the government because it had the majority of seats
amongst the organized political groups.28
On taking leadership, the SLPP sought to consolidate its hold on power by intimidating and weakening opposition groups. 29 Rural chiefdoms were encouraged

to harass and intimidate opposition politicians. 30 At the same time, the SLPP en31
ticed leaders of opposition parties to abandon their parties and join its ranks.
Though the long-term benefit of this strategy was doubtful, it succeeded in temporarily eliminating threats against its leadership.32 Magai pursued policies aimed at
cutting the electoral base for the opposition parties, as well as debilitating their efforts to consolidate their internal structures.33 By the time of his death on April 28,
1964, Magai had created a strong central government controlled by a small clique
of wealthy African elites.34 His management style had encouraged and indeed
sanctioned the use of the state instrumentality to convert political power and posi-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Kambu

See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 158.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 170. Janneh, an APC supporter, was jailed by the Native Court in Samu Chiefdom,
district, for incitement and undermining the authority of the paramount chief. See

CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15.

31. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 168. A prominent APC supporter, Samura Sesay, announced
on October 20, 1962 that he was abandoning APC because it had "no substantial political ideology."
See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 170. For example, an APC candidate was deported back to Liberia after winning
council elections in Freetown on a very flimsy allegation of being a Liberian. See id.
34. See id. at 156.
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tions into economic wealth for the privileged minority group.?5 To a large extent,
this explains the decay of state economic power in the years that followed, despite
the abundance of mineral and other natural resources within the territory of Sierra
Leone. 36 It also explains why the endemic problems of corruption and other malfeasance became defining characteristics of successive regimes, let alone a justifying epithet for the military coups the country was to endure in the following decade.37 In many ways, the stage had been set for Sierra Leone's descent into turmoil
and political quagmire. 8
After Milton Magai's death, his brother, one Albert Magai, thence occupied
the office of the Prime Minister.3 9 His reign was characterized by high levels of
corruption, mismanagement, and political highhandedness, an all too familiar pattern of postcolonial administration in most African countries. 40 Freedom of speech
was nonexistent as the government cracked down hard on pro-opposition newspapers.4 1 Political rallies were strictly regulated by law: 42 before any gathering could
be allowed, the conveners were required to obtain licenses from regional government officials. 3 The judiciary was equally muzzled . In 1965, the Chief Justice
of Sierra Leone, Sir Samuel Bankole-Jones, was removed from office and appointed the President of the Court of Appeal.45 His removal was attributed to his
unwavering belief for the independence of the judiciary.4 6 He refused to be compromised into being an SLPP stooge and often times acquitted persons who were
perceived to be anti-government 7 Albert Magai also sought to destroy opposition
parties and impose a one-party state . 48 On March 30, 1965, he told APC members
of parliament that "the tide was ebbing fast" and that it would soon be easy to
eliminate them:
Now coming to the one party system in this country, if my interpretation is correct
the question of one party is a reality within this house.. In the past when we

35. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 156.

36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See

id. at 170.
id.
id.
id.

40. See id.
41. See id. at 201. In one such case, a local newspaper reported that the Prime Minister had condemned corruption in the Produce and Marketing Board. According to the paper, the managing director
and other senior managers of the Board had used the Boards assets for their own development. When a
private criminal prosecution was instituted, the Attorney General hurriedly entered a nolle prosequi on
the grounds that the move had been accentuated by political reasons. The editor and the reporter who
did the story were arraigned in court on charges of sedition. See id.
42. See id. at 242.
43. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 243. The Public Order Act, its subsequent amendments in
1966, and especially Section 24, gave the chiefs absolute discretion to allow or forbid any meeting of
twelve or more persons within their area ofjurisdiction. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 242.
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speak of a two party system we had a government and a recognized opposition...1
49
am sure that the word "recognized" would not apply to you for long.
The government and other SLPP operatives justified the one party system on
several grounds. 50 First, it was argued that it was in the national interest to have a
one-party state because multi-partyism encouraged tribal polarization that in turn
affected negatively foreign investments. 5' Second, the constant criticism of the
government by the opposition denigrated government image. 52 Third, a one-party
state would eliminate an organized nucleus around which the Prime Minister's personal opponents would rally. 53 Though the idea of a one-party state was later
dropped, the government's performance never improved and the relentless criticism and attack by the opposition leaders further diminished its support amongst
the citizens.54 It is against this backdrop that the general election of 1967 was
called.55
More than anything else, the outcome of this election revealed sharp political
divisions based on tribal or ethnic allegiances. 56 The APC, which won the majority
of votes, secured all seats in the Northern and western provinces mainly inhabited
by the Temne. 5 7 The SLPP, the ruling party, won seats in Mende country. 58 In all,
the APC secured 286,585 (44.3 percent) votes against 231,567 (35 percent) of the
SLPP. 59 The Governor-General proposed that the two parties form a coalition
government. 60 The APC leader Siaka Stevens rejected this proposal outright. 6' A
day later, the Governor-General summoned him to state house and swore him in as
Prime Minister.62 The events that followed were very dramatic. On the same day,
military commander Brigadier David Lansana, on instigation by the besieged
leader of the SLPP, Albert Magai, proclaimed martial law.63 On March 23, a
group of army officers led by Major Charles Blake arrested Lansana, suspended all

49. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 210.

50.
51.
52.
53.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

54. See id.

55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 210.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 249-50.
60. See id. The Governor-General could exercise considerable discretion under the Constitution.
For example, Section 58(6)(a) provided that the office of Prime Minister become vacant when "after
any dissolution... the person holding that office is informed by the governor-general that the governor
general is about to re-appoint him as Prime Minister or to appoint someone else as Prime Minister".
However, he can only do so if "it appears to him that the Prime Minister no longer commands the support of the majority". Whether or not this proviso limits the discretion of the Governor-General or widens it, is really a matter of interpretation. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, 156.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 252.
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political activities, 64 and announced the formation of the "National Advisory
Council" to take charge of the country.65 A year later another military coup took
place and the military junta comprised of non-commissioned officers invited Siaka
Stevens, a civilian leader, to become President.66 Siaka Stevens retired in 1985 to
whose first test of leadership came with the violent
give way to Joseph Momoh,
67
unrest.
student
and
labor
It was during the Momoh regime that the current civil war started. 68 The history of Sierra Leone before this period testifies to the fact that the signs of dissatisfaction amongst the populace and inherent spite for government had emerged early
enough to allow for action, both from the government of Sierra Leone and the international polities. 69 Early warning signs included "the abysmal performance of
the economy, the emergence of a disaffected intelligentsia, the gulf between senior
and junior military officers, and the prospect that the Liberian civil war might
spillover into Sierra Leone.,, 70 Ethnic hatred, accentuated by economic and social
differentiation and fanned by political competition within the dysfunctional state,
catalyzed the insurgency. 7' But, as in other African states, the incumbency took
advantage of the uncertain political atmosphere to line its pockets with the coun72
try's wealth, completely oblivious to the plight of the masses.
Thus, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the country in
1991, most Sierra Leonians welcomed the effort to rid the country of corrupt and
ineffective leadership. 73 The civil war in Sierra Leone rages even today. 74 Many
efforts to resolve it have failed because of the international community's unwillingness to come to terms with the deeply engrained social differentiation that the
leadership in Sierra Leone has imprinted over the four decades since the country's
independence.75 The lack of political will, coupled with incongruent policy formulations, has resulted in inept interventionist programs aimed at fulfilling short-term
goals.76 This article suggests that such programs have had the effect of prolonging
the war and maintaining a weak and ineffective state structure, which at best serves
the interests of smugglers and international business concerns which benefit from
contraband goods.

64. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 252.
65. See id. at 254.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Alfred B. Zack-Williams, Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98, 20
THIRD WORLD Q. 143, 159 (1999).
71. See id.
72. See Zack-Williams, supra note 70, at 159.
73. See id.
74. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 255.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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THE REALITY OF THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR

As witnessed from most writings on the subject of peace and conflict, the reality of a conflict is often overshadowed by the subaltern concern for its consequences. 77 The latter presents to academia, mainstream media, and political organizations an amiable platform from which to configure their response. 78
Concern for refugees, incarceration of war criminals, provision of humanitarian
aid, and rehabilitation of child soldiers and many other reactive programs of this
type have assumed prominence at the expense of integrated and pragmatic approaches capable of not only satisfying the exigencies of the moment, but creating
an enduring framework for societal reconstruction, support, and accommodation.7 9
The reason is understandable. Most politically motivated responses define their
constituency in terms of what is achievable in the short term. The UN Security
Council for example, will pass resolutions that mandate action within a specific
period. 0 After expiry of that period, concerned parties must seek a fresh mandate.8 1 It is ironic that while politicians are quick to proclaim success measured in
terms of the short term strategies, they are nevertheless slow
to commit to a long82
term program of sustaining the fruits of that success, if any.
The above notwithstanding, addressing the consequences of a conflict could
provide a window through which the underlying forces responsible for its eruption
could be discerned and ultimately remedied. Interventionist programs in conflict
situations must thus incorporate and indeed define their constituency in a more
elaborate, flexible, and inclusive fashion so as to be able to evolve pragmatic responses. Obviously, the overall objective must be right and the political climate
favorable. The absence of such expansive programs has in many ways undermined
the ability of the UN and indeed other regional and sub-regional organizations to
resolve African conflicts. 83 Interventionist programs heralded by international legal institutions find themselves in a rather awkward position in this regard. Their
preoccupation with punishment or retribution based on the sancrosanctity of extant
norms is questioned by the prevalence of violations of human rights and other internationally recognized principles all over the globe. 4 Further, in conflict situations, both sides violate one norm or the other. After all, war is all about gains.
The war crimes tribunals, whenever they are
established, end up punishing the los5
ers even if the victors were just as guilty.

77. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 255.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See e.g., U.N. SCOR, 98 h Sess., Doc. 1156/98, 1162/98, 1171/98, and 1181/98. The UN Security Council has passed more than six resolutions extending the mandate for UN keeping forces in
Sierra Leone. In 1998 alone, there were four extensions. See U.N. SCOR, 98 t Sess., Doc. 1171/98.
81. See id.
82. See Laurence Juma, Regional Initiatives for Peace: Lessons from IGAD and
ECOWAS/ECOMOG, 40 AFR. Q. 85, 87 (2000).
83. See id.

84. Id.
85. See generallyZack-Williams, supra note 70, at 159.
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In the case of Sierra Leone, the difficulty of pursuing such an objective may
be compounded by the fact of a continuing civil war. Moreover, the catalogue of
causality factors exemplified through the consequences of the war attests to the
fact that an appropriate approach far more than the envisaged war crimes tribunal
may be required. 6 Improper governance structure, ethnicity, abuse of human
rights, economic mismanagement, and the evolution of a lumpen proletariat - all
these factors combined to constitute a substantial base for the eruption of violence
and conflict in Sierra Leone. 87 Interventionist programs that fail to address these
factors will no doubt fail to make a positive impact towards the resolution of the
conflict. The lop-sided approach actuated by ad hoc programs may in fact prolong
the war. In the following section, I attempt a discussion of the most salient of
these factors with the view of showing that the envisaged war crimes tribunal may
indeed be a far cry from an integrated international response that may foster the
resolution of the ongoing civil war and restore peace in Sierra Leone.
Improper GovernanceStructures:
Sierra Leone's descent into war was a result of the progressive weakening of
the state structure due to inept leadership. 88 Throughout its history, Sierra Leone
never constructed legitimate political institutions capable of generating legitimate
political leadership. 89 Instead, its leadership evolved a predatory functionality, redirecting the use of political power towards pillage, massification of society, and
the acquisition of wealth by the ruling elite. 90 A dysfunctional state, incapable of
exercising political power towards maintaining national cohesion, proved helpless
in the face of a deadly struggle for access to the country's mineral resources. 9' Because the state's autonomy was completely eroded and legitimate political order
lacking, infiltration into the government by corrupt and incompetent personalities
became a matter of political expediency.92 During his reign, Siaka Stevens turned
over the entire diamond and fishing industry to his friend and business associate,
an Afro-Lebanese named Jamil Said Mohammed,93 who became so powerful that
he "attended cabinet meetings though he was not a minister, on occasion vetoed
ministerial appointments, reversed ministerial decisions and routinely violated
government foreign exchange regulations. 94
The country's leadership was controlled by elites who were not only steeped
in massive corruption, but also used their wealth to propagate terror. 95 President

86. See Zack-Williams, supra note 70, at 159
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Jimmy D. Kandeh, Ransoming the State: Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone, 81
REv. AFR. POL. ECON. 349, 351 (1999).
95. See id.
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Ahmed Tejan Kabba, on being reinstated to power on March 10, 1998, lamented at
the collaboration of prominent leaders with rebels:
[T]he people we forgave and those whose misdeeds we overlooked were the key
collaborators with those who raped our women and children, killed unarmed men
and women and almost destroyed our country... While we unreservedly condemn
the junta and its RUF allies, we must not forget to ask ourselves why it happened.
Where did we go wrong as a nation?.. .[G]reed and treachery... were the underlying causes of this tragedy... Some of the collaborators were
96 the very people who
presided over this system of corruption and incompetence.
Despite the rhetoric, Kabba's government has failed to rid itself of the socalled "corrupt and incompetent politicians. 97 The inclusion of former war criminals into the cabinet 98 and the invitation of two Lebanese businessmen, Musa K.
Suma and Jamil Said Mohammed, back into the country, have irked many Sierra
Leonians. 99 Kabba has also been criticized for overlooking corruption in the govemment.1°° A crisis of leadership exists in Sierra Leone. The crisis, reminiscent of
the systematic destruction of legitimate political institutions capable of generating
democratic leadership structures, needs to be remedied by the establishment of
democratic institutions based on civil authority.°1 '
Ethnicity
The civil war in Sierra Leone has not been categorized as an "ethnic conflict"
because it manifests no ethnic, religious, or communal challenge to the government.' 12 Kaufman observes that ethnic groups in conflict "hold irreconcilable visions of identity, borders and citizenship of the state."' 3 Because the RUF and
other rebel organizations in Sierra Leone are neither homogeneous in terms of their
ethnic composition nor do they propagate ethnic claims to territory or power, the
ethnic question, though potent, has been largely ignored. 10 4 The civil war in Sierra
Leone may not be an ethnic conflict in the popular conception of the term, but the
factors responsible for its eruption have ethnic bearing. 0 5 Further, the resolution
of the ongoing civil war may ultimately depend on how the Sierra Leone society
will be able to deal with ethnic cleavages that have become so manifest during the

96. Kandeh, supra note 94, at 349.
97. Id. at 349
98. See id.
99. See Kabbah'sComeback, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Feb. 10, 1998, at 7.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See JOHN DARBY, SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE: CONFLICTING CULTURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
111 (1997) (noting that the term "ethnic conflicts" now describes a specific area of study that has acquired its own academic space).
103. Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict, 20 INT'L SECURITY
136, 174 (1996).
104. See id.
105. See id.at 175.
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war. 1' 6 By examining the evolution of the problems of ethnic diversity in Sierra
Leone, a little light may be shed on how international responses to the civil war
situation could take cognizance of ethnic polarities and hopefully convert such tensions into useful synergies for societal transformation and development.
Ethnicity is a term that has often been associated with conflict and intrastate
violence. 17 The genocide in Rwanda, the civil wars in Congo and Somali, and the
problems in the Balkans have all been attributed to ethnic differences. 08 Ethnicity
has become a term of art used to describe cultural identities of groups in conflict.' 09
The term derives meaning from a somewhat misleading precept that ethnic identities are primordial and that such identity difference motivates people into war.' l
Scholars who support this view argue that human persons have a primordial need
for group affiliations that can only be satisfied by the maintenance of identity."'
In their view, ethnic contests are inherent to human nature and cannot be explained
merely in terms of political competition in a modern society.2 For example,
Shills argues that the group concern based on primordial attachments is "unresponsive to the symbols of a larger society." ' 1 3 According to him, "the ethos and tone
necessary for the maintenance of civil society is seen to be inimical to the fervour
and passion of the primary group."' "1 4 This assertion has been discredited on many
counts. 15 Van Den Berghe summarizes the tenuity of this position as follows:
Primordial position on ethnicity is vulnerable on two scores. 1. It generally
stopped at asserting that fundamental nature of ethnic sentiments without suggesting any explanations of why that should be the case.. .What kind of mysterious
and suspicious force was this "voice of blood" that moved people to tribalism, racism, and ethnic intolerance? 2. If ethnicity was primordial, then was it not so
ineluctable and immutable? Yet, patently, ethnic sentiments waxed and waned
according to circumstances... How
are all these circumstantial fluidity reconcil6
able with primordialist position?''
Ethnicity refers to the entire cultural attributes of a person or group of persons. 11 7 An ethnic group shares a language, tradition, and customs unique from

106. See Kaufman, supra note 103, at 175.
107. See id.

108. See John Mueller, The Banality of Ethnic War, 25 INT'L SECURITY 42, 62 (2000) (arguing that
even in the cases of Yugoslavia and Rwanda ethnicity was not the cause of the conflict but a mere "ordering device or principal."). In his view, ethnicity in these cases "proved essentially to be simply the
characteristic around which the perpetrators and politicians who recruited and encouraged them happened to array themselves." See id.
109.
110.
111.
(1957).
112.

See id.
See John Bowen, Ethnic Relations: Ethnicity: Pluralism, CURRENT, January 1997, at 16.
See generally Edward Shils, Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties, 8 BRIT. J. SOC. 130
See id.

113. Jdat 143.
114. Idat 144.
115. See PIERE VAN DEN BERGHE, ETHNIC PHENOMENON 16 (1981).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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other groups.llS It is thus a segment of a larger society whose members are perceived, by themselves or others, as having "a common origin and.. .shar[ing] important segments of a common culture" and also "participat[ing] in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients.", 19
Ethnicity is not necessarily negative. In all societies, aspects of ethnic culture, tradition, dressing, and food are a source of great pride. 120 One scholar has observed:
Attitudes towards ethnicity have changed dramatically over the years to the point
when to be lacking in an ethnic background is to be perceived as culturally disadvantaged.. .Today ethnic identity is not a shameful thing: In fact its absence is.
Ethnic pride is not limited to the group itself: It is the heritage of each and every
member. It is the savor
and remembrance of the past. More important, it's the
21
promise of the future.'
Moreover, recent studies have shown that liberalization and democratization
can both take place in situations of great ethnic diversity.' 22 Advancing this instrumentalist notion of ethnicity, Glickman has written:
[D]espite the persistence of ethnic conflict in the politics of all African states, significant liberalization and democratization are possible... [Clertain constitutional
and democratic practices permit the expression and demonstration of ethnic differences in relatively constructive ways. Ethnic conflict is not incompatible with
institutions of democratic government if it finds expression as a group interest
among other interests, and if the 2means
of expression provide openings for re3
wards and not merely sure defeats.'

This is a radical departure from the hitherto common understanding that democracy was impossible to nurture in multiethnic conditions. 124 j ohn Stuart Mills
thought that democracy could not exist in such societies because "free institutions
are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities."' 125 Bingham
Powell believes that government instability correlates with ethnic fractionalization. 126 In his work, Contemporary Democracies, he argues that there is indeed a
positive relationship between increasing fractionalization and high rates of death
by violence. 127 In a more recent discourse, Arend Lijphart has written that the optimal number of groups for peaceful ethnic conflict management is2 three
to four
8
with the conditions becoming less favorable as the numbers increase.

118. PIERE VAN DEN BERGHE, ETHNIC PHENOMENON 16 (1981).
119. YINGER J. MILTON, ETHNICITY, SOURCE OF STRENGTH? SOURCE OF CONFLICT?

3 (1994).

120. See id.
121. A.P. ROYCE, ETHNIC IDENTITY: STRATEGY OF DIVERSITY 231-32 (1982).
122. See ETHNIC CONFLICT AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 2 (Harvey Glickman ed., 1995).

123. Id. at 3.
124. See id. at 4.
125. JOHN S. MILLS, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 230 (1958).

126. G.

BINGHAM POWELL JR., CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION,
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127. See id.
128. See AREND
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Generally speaking, the peoples of Africa are divided into "tribes, ' 129 a term
coined by early European ethnographers in an attempt to show that the members of
the primitive society had unique ethnic identities. 30 During the "scramble for Africa," European powers curved out spheres of influences in the African continent
declaring them colonies and protectorates. 131 In the process, Africa was partitioned
into over fifty separate territories.' 32 Administrative regions set up by the colonizers did not necessarily respect the ethnic boundaries of the African people. In
many cases, groups found themselves living on either side of the administrative
boundary. 33 The African peoples stiffly resisted the imposition of colonial rule. 34
The resistance was a crucial factor in the evolution of colonial administrative policies. 135 The policy of indirect rule, for example, emerged out of the need to minimize African opposition to colonial administration at the local level. 136 The policy,
considered to have been largely responsible for the pacification of the Africans and
the sustenance of the colonial hegemony, owed its success to the "tribalization" of
the Africans. 137 In essence, the policy of indirect rule relied on the succinct recognition of the difference between the British and their colonial subjects as well as
that between the various African groups. 138 Thus, it advocated for the use of African institutions to govern the Africans as progress was made to civilize and transform African cultures to modernity. 139 Through this process, tribes were made or
unmade depending on the administrative convenience of the colonizers. 40 Manning observes that:
[E]thnicity was sometimes simply a matter of administrative convenience; the
government labelled a group or combined several groups to fit its convenience,

(1977).

129. LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY 40 (1964). In this paper, "tribe" is used interchangeably with "ethnic group." "Tribe" is given a wider meaning than the original reference to a division of
the Roman people. In some discourses "tribe" has been used to make reference to a small, preliterate
and pre-industrial, relatively isolated, endogamous (with exogamous sub-tribal divisions), united mainly

by kinship and culture and strongly ethnocentric. See id.at 42. "Tribe" has also been defined as a
group with "a common territory, a tradition of common descent, common language, common culture, a
common name." CAROLE E. DUPRE, THE LUO OF KENYA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 (1968).

From "tribe" comes the word "tribalism," a pejorative inscription of the differences amongst African
peoples based on culture, language, social structure and political organization. See id.
130. See PATRICK MANNING, FRANCOPHONE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1880-1995 41 (1998).

131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. For example, the Ewe were divided between Gold Coast and Togo, Ibo between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Somali between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somali. See THE FUTURE OF THE
CENTRALIZED STATE: INSTITUTION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 35 (Dele Oluwu & James S.
Wunsch, eds., 1990).
134. See generally WEST AFRICAN

OCCUPATION (Michael Crowder ed., 1971).
135. MANNING, supra note 130, at 41.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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and the label stuck. Many of the labels by which African ethnic groups are known

today were given to them in the beginning of this century by the colonial officials
4
who wrote studies of these groups in hopes of learning how better to rule them.' 1
Like many social processes, ethnic relations have always been influenced by
historical factors. 42 The transition to modem statehood and the onset of colonial
hegemony was initially characterized by the discrimination of subordinate
groups. 143 This subordination was facilitated by the stigmatization of the said
144
groups, whose ethnic tendencies and way of life were considered sub-human.
The identities often ascribed to the subordinate groups were artificial and not primordial. 45 The impact of colonialism in the ethnic relations in many African
countries can be summarized as follows. First, the boundaries created by colonial
administrations defied the primordial geographical structure of the African communities.146 Technically, the ethnic groups were unified (in a very informal sense)
in the state system.147 Second, the colonial policy incorporated ethnic flavor in its
administrative system.148 Third, it created a system of uneven development, thus
magnifying ethnic cleavages. 149 Finally, it encapsulated Christian religious tendencies by allowing missionary activity to "pacify" the ethnic groups so as to ease
political domination. 150 The interplay of these factors raised ethnic consciousness
to be part and parcel of the African political life. 15 In the post-colonial era, ethnicity is perceived as the opposite of a national culture, and thus inimical to the
propagation of civic unity.152 The trend in Africa has been to downplay the impor153
tance of ethnicity and to devise institutions that would minimize its impact.
"Tribalism," or allegiance to ethnic grouping, is discouraged in public and yet privately manipulated for political mileage. 154 Political manipulation of ethnic differ-

141. MANNING, supra note 130, at 42-43.
142. See id. at 43.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 41.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. For example, in Rwanda the colonial rule helped shape the state building processes
that propagated the "corporate vision of the ethnic groups." Catherine Newbury, Ethnicity and Politics
of History in Rwanda, 45 AFRICA TODAY 7, 11 (1998).
150. See MANNING, supra note 130, at 94. Archbishop Desmond Tutu in his acceptance speech of
the Nobel Peace Price in 1984 said, "when the missionaries came, they had the bible and we had the
land. They said, 'Let us pray.' They taught us to close our eyes to pray and when we opened them
again, we had the bible and they had the land." BILL RAU, FROM FEAST TO FAMINE: OFFICIAL CURES
AND GRASS ROOTS REMEDIES TO AFRICA'S FOOD CRISIs 31 (1991).
151. See MANNING, supranote 130, at 41.
152. See id.
153, See id. For example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5(1981) reprinted in 21 ILM 59 (1982), also known as the 'Banjul Charter,'
avoided the mention of ethnic groups and instead used "peoples" as constituent members of society.
See Richard Kiwanuka, The Meaning of People in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1988).
154. See MANNING, supranote 130, at 35.
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ences may well be the major cause of African intrastate conflicts.' 55
According to a 1995 study, ethnic divergences will become disruptive if several risk factors exist.' 56 T hese include a history of lost political autonomy, active
economic and political discrimination against groups, and a history of state repression.157 The risk posed by these factors is compounded by a group's capacity to
sustain collective action and the availability of opportunity for such action. 58 Recent discourse suggests that ethnic conflicts are a creature of the post cold war
era. 59 This may not be entirely true; ethnic contests and skirmishes have been
with us all along.16 In Africa, tribal wars predate the arrival of the European colonizers. 16' Yet in all these cases, the wars were not as disruptive as the civil wars
experienced today.' 62 Sources of conflict were clearly delineated and, once resolved, the ethnic groups lived together in peace. 63 Whatever differences existed
between the various ethnic groups were submerged during the independence struggles, but only resurfaced after independence. 164 This indicates that ethnicity can be
responsive to civic nationalism and hence foster peace. In the words of Bowen,
"states do make choices, particularly about political processes, that ease or exacerbate inter-group tensions... What the myth of ethnic conflict65 would say are everpresent tensions, are in fact the product of political choices."
When Sierra Leone was declared a British protectorate in 1896, the country
was inhabited by the Temne, Mende, the Limba, Kono, and about 12 other indigenous African tribes. 166 Significant populations of the "Creole" were also in occupation. 167 Comprised of Africans liberated from slaving ships, those coming from
England, refugees fleeing the American Revolution, and the Maroon from Jamaica
and Nova Scotia, 168 the Creole were by far the most politically articulate segment
of the African community. 169 They were also the most educated and economically

155. See MANNING, supra note 130, at 35.
156. See Ted Robert Gurr & Monty G. Marshall, Assessing Risks of Future Ethnic Wars, in
PEOPLES VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY 1, 7 (Gurr eds., 1998).
157. See id.

158. See id.
159. See id. at 9.
160. See MANNING, supra note 130, at 35.
161. See id. These wars were predicated upon the need to secure grazing lands or merely retrieve
stolen cattle. The rules of war were definite and everybody involved knew of the methods of bringing it
to an end. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. John R. Bowen, The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 4, 12-13 (1996).
166. See generally CHRISTOPHER FYFE, A HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE (1962).
167. See ARTHUR T. PORTER, CREOLEDOM: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREETOWN

SOCIETY 3-16 (1963). "Creole" is a collective name given to former African slaves who were resettled
along the Sierra Leone coast. See id.; see also ALEXANDER PETER KUPP, SIERRA LEONE: A CONCISE
HISTORY 114 (1975).
168 See generally MAVIS C. CAMPBELL, BACK TO AFRICA: GEORGE ROSS AND THE MAROONS:
FROM NOVA SCOTIA TO SIERRA LEONE (1993).
169. See PORTER, supra note 167, at 12.
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active.' 70 The British colonial administration used them as a medium through
which policies could be propagated amongst the indigenous communities. 171 They
were "sufficiently westernized" as compared to the people of the interior and
could, therefore, "act as spearheads of the western cultural advance."'172 The African suspicion of the Creole was widespread and within two years of the declaration
of the protectorate, it erupted in the Hut Tax War of 1898.173 During the independence movements, the involvement of the Creole was highly detested. 74 Dr. Margai, while in parliament in 1947, lamented thus:
Sierra Leone, which has been the foremost of all west African colonies, is still
saddled with archaic constitution with official majority. The reason for this
backwardness is evidently due to the fact that that our forefathers, I regret very
much to say, had given shelter to a handful of foreigners [i.e., Creoles] who have
no will to cooperate with us and imagine themselves to be our superiors because
they are aping the western mode of living, and have never breathed the true spirit
of independence. . .We are very much unfortunate to have with us in this country a
handful of foreigners whose leaders, whatever one may do, can never bring themselves to wipe off the superiority complex, and they imagine themselves more like
Europeans than Africans, which is indeed a very sad state of affairs; moreover
75
they have never impressed us as being sincere in their actions towards us.'
The ascendancy of indigenous Africans to leadership after the declaration of

76
independence in 1961 accentuated bitter political rivalry amongst them.1 Politi-

cal party competition, coupled with corruption and inept leadership, magnified the
claims to power based on ethnic allegiance. 177 The SLPP, mainly a Mende outfit,
formed government amidst great mistrust by other parties. 7 7 The UPC, a rival
party having support amongst the northerners - mainly the Limba and Temne J'79
succeeded in dislodging the SLPP from power after the 1967 elections. 80 At the
beginning of the UPC reign, tribal rioting between the Mende and Temne occurred
in many parts of the country."'8 Though these riots were eventually suppressed by

170. See PORTER, supra note 167, at 12.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id. About 1,000 Creoles were slaughtered by the Mende in this war. See CARTWRIGHT,
supra note 15, at 16. See also FYFE, supra note 166, at 558-559.
174- See PORTER, supra note 167, at 13.
175. MARTIN KILSON, POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE: A STUDY OF THE

169 (1966).
176. See MANNING, supra note 130, at 52.
177. See id.
178. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 61. The SLPP was formed in 1951 after the dissolution of
the Sierra Leone Organization Society (SOS), a representative body created for the purposes of advancing educational goals. The leaders of SLPP were Dr Magai, a grandson of a Mende warrior chief and
son of a wealthy merchant, his brother Albert, Chief Julius Gulama, AJ Momoh, Arthur Masally, and
William Fitzjohn, all of whom were from the Mende ethnic group. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at
61.
179. See id..
180. See id.
181. See id.
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the government, "the Mendes remained un-reconciled to the change of the regime." 182
With the onset of the civil war, things have become worse. 183 The conflict itself is not without its share of ethnic influence.' 4 Bangura makes a befitting
summation of the situation that "even though the RUF rebellion is not ethnic, and
the RUF (more eastern and southern composition) and AFRC (more northern and
western area) formed an alliance in pursuing a common goal, the conflict had
strong ethnic overtones among key political elites."'18 5 While addressing a London
Conference in 1997, President Kabba acknowledged that "tribal differences" were
the biggest cause of the Sierra Leone problems. 186 But his regime has done little to
obviate this calamitous state of affairs.18 7 His recruitment of the ethnic Kamajor to
be part of the national security apparatus and his failure to ensure equitable distribution of civil service jobs has not made it any better. 88 Ethnic problems continue
to bedevil Sierra Leone's political development and may diminish any gains made
so far in the peace process. 189
Economic Depravity and the Rise of Lumpen Proletariat
By the time Siaka Stevens hand picked Momoh to succeed him, the state was
already on the verge of collapse.' 90 The gross domestic product (GDP) had fallen
from $1.1 billion in 1980 to a paltry $857 million and the annual growth rate from
3 percent to 1 percent, while international reserves stood at only $5 million.' 9' No
single economic sector or activity registered any growth.' 92 The export sector had
been utterly ruined by closure of iron mines and diamond smuggling by rogue politicians. 193 The economy was hard hit by the massive debt burden, with external
debt alone amounting to $723 million.' 94 With the dismal performance of the economic sector, the government's grip of power slowly drifted from state bureaucracy to a consortium of corrupt politicians and businessmen financed by mineral
riches, especially diamonds. 195

182. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 15, at 62.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Yusuf Bangura, Strategic Policy Failure and Governance in Sierra Leone, 38 J. MODERN
AFR.STUD. 4, 551-553 (2000).
186. See A Recipe for Anarchy, WEST AFRICA, Oct. 29, 1997 at 1671.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Zach-Williams, supra note 70, at 153.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. Sierra Leone is currently listed as one of the poorest countries on earth. Its life expectancy is estimated at 40, literacy at 30 percent and infant mortality rate at 179 per 1000 births. Less
than a third of the population have access to health services, safe drinking water, and sanitation. It has a
GNPof $180. See id.
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Long before the war, economic deprivation had created a lumpen class
amongst the youths in Sierra Leone. 196 This group of urban youth, for whom combat appeared to be the only viable means of survival, formed a reservoir from
which the RUF could recruit soldiers. 197 According to some analysts, recruitments
into the RUF occurred heavily amongst lumpen youth living in Freetown who were
then taken to Libya for military training. 198 Bangura has noted:
Majority of those trained in Libya were either from the loosely structured "lumpen" classes or those with troubled educational history... drawn from a stratum of
Sierra Leonean society that is hooked on drugs, alcohol and street gambling.
They have a very limited education and are prone to gangster type of activities sometimes acting as clients of "strong men" in society or leading political figures
and government officials. 99
In every aspect of the RUF campaign, the lumpen culture has manifested itself 20 0 The ruthlessness exemplified by the human rights abuses, theft, and pillage
of resources are all deeply engrained into the culture of the lumpen youth in many
cities of Africa. 2 0 ' No wonder that they were attracted by the "simplistic emancipatory rhetoric" of the RUF commanders and motivated by the acquisition of
wealth through extralegal means:
The "freedom fighter" mantle - idealized in pote culture and given resonance by
the RUF's appeal and initial success - coupled with the reversal of social hierarchy through the possession of the means of violence, had long been perceived in
the lumpen world view as a necessary route to heroism and self-actualization.2 2
Sierra Leonians need to revitalize their economy and international assistance
towards this objective may indeed be necessary. The IMF structural adjustment
strategies, which have in the past contributed to the impoverization and lumpenization of Sierra Leone society, do not speak well of past involvement by the international community. 20 3 Moreover, the overt dealings in the mining industry by international conglomerates, despite condemnation of trade in contraband diamonds
from Sierra Leone and other conflict areas, valorizes the hope that globalization
trends may catalyze economic development and hence foster peace. 204

196. See Yusuf Bangura, Understandingthe Politicaland CulturalDynamics of Sierra Leone War:
A Crtique of Paul RichardsFightingforthe Rain Forest,XXII AFR. DEV. 114, 117 (1997).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 126.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, in
AFRICAN GUERILLAS 178 (1998).
203. See id. at 179.
204. See id.
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III. THE SIERRA LEONE PEACE PROCESS

The primary objective of any peace process is to bring the conflict to an end.
As described by one treatise, peace processes represent the "state of tension between the custom of violence and the resolution of differences through negotiation., 20 5 They defy any uniform definition, as the methods that may be employed
in instigating and conducting negotiations will always depend on the nature of the
conflict. 20 6 The process may involve a range of activities, from discreet night
meetings to visible and high-level political talks, both of which may culminate in
agreements between the parties (often referred to as Accords).20 7 There may be
several of such activities in any one conflict, spanning over a long period of time.
The Israel/Palestine peace process is still continuing, 20 8 while the peace process to
the Liberian civil war may have ended with the election held in 1998.209 Both the
protracted nature of peace processes and the fluidity of the parties' commitment to
the Accords have fuelled skepticism on their viability as proper instruments of conflict resolution.210 In some instances, the government in power, in complete disregard of the effects of the conflict, may seek to use the peace process as an alternative to a military campaign against the rebels. 211 They may perceive the process as
a means of legitimizing their retention of power.2 12 In other cases, the peace process may merely slow the momentum of the conflict without altering its eventual
outcome.21 3 In Rwanda, for example, the peace process and the concomitant Accords signed in Arusha failed to forestall the military takeover by the RPF and may
have catalyzed the genocide.214 Lemarchand observes:
The transition bargain in Rwanda emerges in retrospect as a recipe for disaster;
not only were the negotiations conducted under tremendous external pressures,
but partly for this reason, the concessions made to the FPR were seen by the Hutu
hard-liners as a sell out imposed by outsiders. For the Tutsi "rebels" to end up
claiming as many cabinet posts in the transitional government as the ruling
MNRD (including interior and communal development) as well as half of the
field-grade officers and above, was immediately viewed by extremists in the so

205. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, Conclusion: The Management of Peace, in
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called "mouvance presidententielle" as a surrender to blackmail. 215

The disparity in the methods, structure, and even the product of negotiations
in the many peace processes that have been studied, indicate the near impossibility
of drawing an accurate and uniform methodology for negotiating peace.216 However certain general characteristics are imbibed in many peace processes. 217 The
immediate cessation of hostilities (generally referred to as a ceasefire), the inclusion of all parties to the negotiations, and the disarmament and reform of the army
and other government security apparatus are all factors which peace processes seek
to address at the first available opportunity. 218 The complex issues of government
and sharing of power, as well as human rights concerns, if any, usually come
later.21 9

When the Sierra Leone civil war broke out in 1991, the country was greatly
divided between proponents of the All Peoples Party (APC) regime and the growing number of embittered political and business rivals. 220 However, it was a small
force of the little known Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Saybana
Sankoh, who crossed the Manu River from Liberia into the southern Pejehun district of Sierra Leone to begin a military campaign against the government. 22' The
Momoh regime dismissed the insurgence as inconsequential, believing they posed
no threat to his hold on power.222 In 1992, disgruntled army generals overthrew
Momoh and Captain Valentine Strasser became chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).223 Despite the NPRC's claim that one of its principal objectives was to end the war, no tangible efforts were made to negotiate
peace with the RUF.224 Instead, the NPRC directed its military efforts towards securing Kono, the mineral rich district, from the rebel infiltration.2 5 The government acquired the services of Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African mercenary outfit, to help ward off rebel advances to the mineral-rich areas. 226 While

215. R. Lemarchand, Managing TransitionAnarchies: Rwanda, Burundi andSouth Africa in Comparative Perspective, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 4, 581 (1994).
216. See id. at 582.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 583.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See Lemarchand, supra note 215, at 584.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See David J. Francis, MercenaryIntervention in Sierra Leone: ProvidingNational security or
InternationalExploitation, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 319, 328 (1999). Executive Outcomes (EO) came on
the scene in March 1995 after Gurkha Security Guards Ltd., a UK based mercenary outfit, had failed to
completely wipe out the RUF threat in the diamond mining areas. EO is part of Strategic Resources
Corporation, a multinational firm which also owns Branch-Heritage Group, a mining and exploration
company. There is no coincidence that EO was involved in the Angolan civil war, another diamond
rich nation. Its deployment in Sierra Leone cost the government $ 1.225 million a month in salary and
huge concessions to Branch-Heritage Company. In return, EO would provide 150-2000 soldiers fully
equipped with helicopter support, train a national army, and assist in the war against RUF. See id.
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widespread looting, corruption, and opulence became evident amongst the higher
echelons of military leadership, the lower cadre military personnel and the public
were not happy with the government.227 On January 16, 1996, Strasser's deputy
carried out a military coup that sent Strasser to exile and installed Julius Maada
Bio as the new head of state.228
The new government was more receptive to the idea of peace negotiations
with the rebels. 22 9 Bio made public announcements calling for peace and asking
Sankoh to agree to meet him, assured Sankoh and his supporters of a "safe travel
passage," and decreed amnesty to all combatants to facilitate their participation in
peace talks. 230 A public demonstration in Freetown and the constitutional conference affirmed the public support for the peace initiative. 23 ' The RUF responded to
these gestures positively and indeed confirmed their willingness to participate in
the peace talks. 2
The Abidjan Accord (1996)
The events leading to the Abidjan Accord affirm the view that parties to a
conflict may be ready for a negotiated settlement when they become aware that
their objectives may no longer be tenable through violence - a condition which
commentators have referred to as a "mutually hurting stalemate" or "ripe moments. 233 At this stage, both sides to the conflict are expected to choose the path
of negotiation so as to convert their weakness into strength and to conserve whatever gains they had previously made.234 In Sierra Leone, by the time of the Abidjan
Accord, the combined force of the government, the Kamajors, and the mercenaries
(EO) had severely overrun the RUF strongholds and pushed them away from the
diamond-rich regions.235 At the same time, the general public and the civil society
were disenchanted with the military leadership. 236 Strong appeals were made for
the restoration of democratic government and the disbanding of the Kamajor
forces.237
The "hurting stalemate" scenario may not solely explain the drive towards the
Abidjan Accord.238 Moreover, the mere acknowledgement of the necessity of a
ceasefire and the desire for negotiations may not be effectuated without the help of
an impartial arbiter who, apart from facilitating negotiations, may also provide
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support and police compliance. 239 In the case of Sierra Leone, the powerful intervention of various organizations exerted considerable pressure on both sides to
concede to a negotiation. 240 Through the efforts of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), London-based International Alert (IA), OAU, and the
lvorian Foreign minister Amara Essy, Sankoh agreed to meet with the NPRC in
Abidjan. 241 The talks, which began on February 1996, coincided with the general
elections in which Ahmed Tejan Kabba was elected president.242 After nine
months of negotiations between the government and the RUF, a peace agreement
was formally drawn in November 1996.243 President Kabba signed the peace
agreement on behalf of the government, while Foday Sankoh did so on behalf of
the RUF. 244
The Accord proclaimed an immediate end to the war and the immediate withdrawal of mercenary and regional forces.245 A disarmament process was to be initiated with the stipulation that the RUF forces would be integrated into the national
security apparatus.246 The agreement also dealt with electoral issues, judicial reform and human rights protection, improved health care, housing and educational
services, job creation, and the protection of the environment.247 A commission for
the consolidation of peace was created in order to oversee the implementation of
the Accord with the assistance of a "neutral Monitoring group from the international community.' '248 The Accord however failed to provide adequate measures
for resolving conflicts within the Commission.249 Other than stating that the
Commission was expected to consult with the RUF and government at the top
most levels, no mention was made of the need to establish or streamline the internal judicial process. 21° This was indeed crucial because after the coup of May 25,
most lawyers, magistrates, and judges had fled the country, leaving judicial functions in the hands of ad hoc military tribunals which were far from being impartial.
251

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Accord was its grant of immunity

239. See MIALL, supra note 234, at 162.
240. See ECOWAS Intervenes to Restore Democracy, AFRICA TODAY, July/Aug. 1997 at 24.
241. See id.
242. See id. The first elections held in February failed to produce clear winners. The Sierra Leone
Peoples Party (SLPP) candidate, Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabba who came out on top failed to secure 55 percent of the total votes and instead had only 35.8 percent. In second place was the United Peoples Party
(UPP) candidate, Dr. John Karefa Smart who received 22 percent, followed by Thaimu Bangura of the
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) with 16 percent. In the run off between SLPP and UPP, the former
emerged the winner. See id. See also SLPP Makes Comeback, WEST AFR., Mar. 17, 1996 at 385.
243. See Abidjan Accord, available at http://www.c-r.org/Accord9/keytext.htm (last visited on
June 6, 2001).
244. See id.
245. See Abidjan Accord at preamble.
246. See id. at art. 5.
247. See id. at art. 18.
248. Id. at art. 11.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See Zack-Williams, supra note 71, at 158.
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to RUF members.

252

Article 14 of the Accord provided that:

To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the
Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken
against any member of the RUF/SL in respect of anything done by them in pursuit
of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of
this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the
country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full
rights, with a view to reintegration within the
exercise of their civil and 2political
3
framework of full legality. "
In essence, the Commission would not have the powers to investigate the
atrocities and human rights violations committed during the war.254 While commentators have acknowledged that the threat of prosecution of the RUF or any
other parties of war crimes may have jeopardized the peace process, the need for
some form of public revelation of such atrocities may have been necessary.255
Bangura called for the establishment of some form of "truth commission" in which
there would be public acknowledgement of the human rights violation by those responsible:
Our society cannot make progress in the area of human rights if we do not
squarely face these atrocities and try to understand why people who claim to be
liberating or defending society from oppression and exploitation had to slit the
throats of innocent villagers, sever their heads, cut their hands, pluck their eyes
off, disembowel pregnant women, abduct and rape women, bum down whole villages and enlist children as young as ten into the war.256
The Accord failed to guarantee a power sharing arrangement between the
constitutionality elected government of President Kabba and the RUF.257 Other
than the military and the National Electoral Commission, RUF participation in
most institutions of government was completely avoided. 258 The RUF was locked
out of parliament, was not given any post in government, and would not control
any local government, district or province.259 One analyst has argued that the elections of 1996, in which the RUF never participated, were considered a great success and thus disturbing its institutions would have attracted a lot of ire from the
sponsors of the Accord.260 It also brought in a new set of players who were not as-

252. See Abidjan Accord, supra note 244 at art. 14.

253. Id.
254. See id.
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256. Id.
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sociated with the causes of war.26'
The ceasefire never materialized as both sides continued fighting.262 Within a
very short period, the bright glow of political fervor and hope that had greeted the
signing of the Accord faded into the dull gray of skepticism and doubt.263 The UN
Security Council failed to back a plan of sending 720 peacekeeping troops, 60
military observers, and about 276 civilian staff, drawn by the UN Secretary General in January 1997.264 Foday Sankoh had equally opposed the creation of a UN
peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. 265 The RUF chief argued that the Accord
had no mention of the UN peacekeeping arrangement and that a force of this nature
may end up getting involved in the conflict. 266 He called for efforts and finances to
be directed towards the reconstruction of the country.267 But a visible UN presence
was indeed necessary at this stage of the peace process, not only for the assistance
of the demobilization process, but also to affirm the international community's
commitment to the peace process.
The problems of implementing the Accord were further compounded by the
arrest of Foday Sankoh in March 1997 in Nigeria.268 In May 1997, President
Kabba was deposed by a military junta headed by Paul Koroma and went into exile
in Guinea_69 Ironically, Koroma claimed in his takeover that the government's
failure to bring peace was one of the major reasons for the coup, blaming the
Kabba government for polarizing the country into "regional and tribal factions. 27 °
The army's loss of political power and marginalization from lucrative political and
economic processes by the civilian government may have prompted this action.271
Furthermore, Kabba's preferred use of the Kamajors instead of the regular army
did not sit very well with military officers and soldiers alike.272 A flurry of international condemnation followed the coup. 273 The OAU ministers meeting in Harare issued a strong communiqud condemning the coup and calling for "the immediate restoration of constitutional order., 274 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
while addressing the same meeting, made a similar appeal: "Where democracy has

261. See Bangura, supra note 256.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Mark Twain, UN Failurein Sierra Leone Feeds Recrimination, THE GUARDIAN, May 29,
1997. The failure of the Clinton administration to support this move was largely responsible for this
inaction. At the time the US congress was involved the "delicate" discussion of the payment of its arrears to the UN amounting to over US $1 billion. See id.
265. See Bangura, supra note 256.
266. See id.
267. See Sierra Leone: Sankoh Sticks Out, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Vol. 38, No. 5, Feb. 28, 1997 at
5.
268. See The Sankoh Affair, NEW AFR., June 1997 at 12.
269. See Sierra Leone: Koroma's Coup, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Vol. 38, No.12, June 6, 1997 at 1.
270. Id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. OAU Council of Ministers 66" Ordinary Session, at Harare, Zimbabwe, May 28-30, 1997,
Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. I at 18.
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been usurped, let us do all in our power to restore it to the people. 275 He called on
"neighboring statcs, regional groups and international organizations" to play their
part in restoring Sierra Leone's constitutional and democratic government.276 The
the United Nations equally called for the restoration
United States government and
277
of democratic government.

The military leadership of the Junta spurred deep hatred from the populace. 278
The wanton killings of opposition personalities and persons suspected of being allied to the Kabba regime were widespread. 279 The ethnic rivalry between the
Limba (from the north) and the Mende (from the south, Kabba's tribe) was heightened by open hostility towards the Mende.28 0 The murder of three persons, all
the distrust and haMendes, at a military camp just outside Freetown exemplified
28
tred with which the Junta viewed their ethnic rivals. '
The Conakry Peace Plan (1997)
The collapse of the Abidjan Accord and the subsequent change of government
in Sierra Leone ushered in new challenges to the peace process.282 New actors
came onto the scene, some of whom had a completely different agenda.283
Amongst the new actors was the sub-regional organization ECOWAS and its peace
keeping forces known as ECOMOG.284 The notable ECOMOG peace involvements in Liberia in 1990 had given it credibility as a viable regional approach to
peace and security. 2 5 The ECOWAS foreign ministers meeting on June 26, 1997,
one month after the coup, recommended a three-pronged approach to the Sierra

275. OAU Council of Ministers 66" Ordinary Session, at Harare, Zimbabwe, May 28-30, 1997,
Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. I at 18.
276. Andrew Meldrum, Annan and OA U Leaders Endorse Intervention Against Usurpers, THE
GUARDIAN,

June 3, 1997.

277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Vol. 38, No. 23, Nov. 21, 1997
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Treaty of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), May 28, 1975, 1010
U.N.T.S. 17, 14 I.L.M. 1200 (1975). ECOWAS was founded in 1975 as a prime vehicle for the promotion of regional cooperation and economic development primarily in industry, communication, energy,
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Leone problem: negotiations, embargo, and the possible use of force.286 Upon request by the deposed President, and also under the SOFA arrangements, Nigeria
unilaterally sent troops into Sierra Leone.287 These were in addition to the Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG), who were already on the ground, and the
ECOMOG forces who had used the country as a base for their operations in Liberia. 88 In August, the ECOWAS heads of state declared a blockade on Sierra
Leone and established what they called a sub-regional force for Sierra Leone,
mandated to enforce the embargo. 28 9 The United Nations Security Council
strongly supported ECOWAS and encouraged it "to continue to work for the
peaceful restoration of constitutional order including through the resumption of
negotiations., 290 The Security Council also imposed an arms and petroleum embargo on the military Junta.29'
Amidst the growing strength of the sub-regional forces, and the mounting international support of a military action against the Junta, the Junta invited the RUF
to join it. 29 2 The absent RUF leader Foday Sankoh was named vice-chairman to
the ruling Junta.293 But the AFRC/RUF alliance was met with civil disobedience
and widespread international condemnation.294 Following the economic sanctions
on Sierra Leone, the economic situation deteriorated to the extent that there was
hardly any petrol in Freetown. 295 Essential drugs were running low and Government revenues fell by ninety percent due to a lack of foreign monetary support.296
There was little option left other than to negotiate the future return of democracy. 297 The Junta also saw this as a window of opportunity to gain legitimacy in
the eyes of the international community and to seek relaxation of economic restric286. See Abass Bundu, Beyond Peace Keeping, WEST AFR., Dec. 6, 1999 at 15.
287. See Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The
Cases of ECOWAS in Liberiaand Sierra Leone, 12 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 366 (1998).
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. U.N. SCOR,. 1132, Oct. 8 1997, UN doc. S/RES/1 132 (1997).
291. See id. Despite the embargo, the British government later in the year supplied arms to Sierra
Leone through a London based mercenary organization, Sandline Ltd., which helped to restore Kabba
to power. The scandal generated a lot of publicity in the British press with some sections calling for the
resignation of foreign secretary Robin Cook and Tony Lloyd, minister of State for Africa. See Richard
Norton-Taylor, Cook Rocked by Coup Row, THE GUARDIAN, May 7, 1998; See also Observer Investigator, THE OBSERVER, May 10, 1998, at 5; Stephen Castle, Nasty Little War in Whitehall, THE
INDEPENDENT, May 10, 1998, at 3. The fiasco begun when Sandline Ltd. was put under 'criminal' investigation on alleged charges of shipping arms to Sierra Leone despite UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (sponsored by Britain). Prime Minister Tony Blair exonerated British officials saying that the
whole matter was an "overblown hoohah'. He later explained the British position as follows:
Don't let us forget that what was happening was that the UN and the UK were both trying to help the democratic regime restore its position from an illegal military coup. They
were quite right in trying to do it.
Baffour Ankomah, Sierra Leone: How the 'Good Guys' Won, NEW AFR., July/Aug. 1998 at 8.
292. See Jump or be Pushed,AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Vol. 39, No 3, 1998 at 7.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id.
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tions.298 In the estimation of the Junta leaders, their hold on power for a little
longer might give them ample opportunity to transform themselves into a political
unit capable of winning election and thus retaining leadership of the country.2 9
The sub-regional forces, spearheaded by Nigeria, exerted extreme military
pressure to match the frantic diplomatic efforts to persuade the Junta to give up
power.300 It was against this background that the AFRC/RUF alliance agreed to
participate in a peace plan signed in Conakry on October 23, 1997.301 The peace
plan was a purely ECOWAS initiative heavily sponsored by Nigeria.3 °2 It set out a
six-month peace plan that called for an immediate end to the fighting, disarmament
and demobilization of troops, resumption of humanitarian aid, return of refugees
and displaced persons, and the restoration of the civilian government. 30 3 The plan
also contained a clause granting
unconditional immunity from prosecution to the
3 °4

plotters of the May 25 coup.

There seemed to be no likelihood that the Junta would peacefully relinquish
power to the Kabba government despite their undertaking at Conakry.30 5 Instead,
Koroma announced his intention to remain in leadership until fresh democratic
elections were held.30 6 He also called for the immediate withdrawal of all Nigerian
troops from the territory of Sierra Leone. 30 7 The RUF, for its part, announced that
its soldiers would not succumb to any disarmament process until Foday Sankoh
was unconditionally released. 30 8 Thus, despite the peace plan, ECOMOG continued its military campaign against the AFRC/RUF alliance.30 9 On February 5,
1998, ECOMOG, with the assistance of arms and ammunition supplied by Sandline Ltd. 3 10 and a strong force of 5,000 Kamajor militias, 31 ' launched a major
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offensive that led to the removal of the Junta from power on February 12, 1998,
and the restoration of Kabba in March of the same year.3 1 2 The UN Security
Council commended ECOMOG for restoring peace in Sierra Leone and authorized
the deployment of UN personnel to assist ECOMOG in the disarmament and demobilization of the rebel forces.313
The return of Kabba and the restoration of the democratically elected government in Sierra Leone have raised the question of the extent to which external
forces influence the political development in Sierra Leone. This issue is crucial to
the understanding of the general management of peace processes in Africa. After
the military takeover of the government, the country was completely torn apart
with no single army dedicated to the defense of the country.314 Regions were locally controlled by whoever had the guns and power to do so. 3 15 The rich mining
fields were in the hands of external companies with strong private security arrangements, with remnants falling to the RUF, belligerent government soldiers,
and ECOMOG.3 16 The government's inability to formulate a coherent policy on
national security has impacted negatively on the peace process. 31 7 The initial program of training and engaging former RSLMF soldiers to constitute a new national
army seems to have withered. 31 8 Thus, while the government continues to rely on
foreign troops, the RUF and other rebel organizations have continued to abduct
young men and children to fill their military ranks. 319 The folly of its reliance on
foreign armies is no less exemplified in the surrender of the country's mineral
wealth to the control of international companies whose interests in making profits
surpass the mere stability of government.32 ° Crucial to the enterprise for peace is
the apparent inability of the government to make decisions as the bona fide representative of the people of Sierra Leone. Kabba has become a stooge whose action
is dictated by power wielders who are by no means controlled by the wishes of the
Sierra Leonians.32 ! Conflicting interests of these power wielders, and the scramble
for minerals and other wealth, has dictated the pace of the peace process.3 2
The collapse of the state system wrought difficulty in the process of creating
viable political leadership capable of commanding support from all sections of Sierra Leone society. 323 It also created a vacuum, which, in the eyes of powerful exSandline's military personnel were also directly involved in the January/February military offensive
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ternal interests, needed to be filled if the lucrative mining industry in Sierra Leone
were to be maintained.324 In this respect, the activities of the international conglomerates involved in the Sierra Leone mining industry are no different from the
complicity of corporate organizations to the apartheid era in South Africa or the
exploitation of human and physical resources during the colonial period.325 The
peace process has become became a game of legitimizing economic interests while
maintaining a favorable international image.
The Lomd Accord (1999)
The negotiations towards the Lomd Accord occurred against a backdrop of
waning public support for the sub-regional military activity and great anxiety due
to the possibility of an RUF overrun of Freetown. 326 Amidst growing international
pressure on the government to open negotiations with the AFRC/RUF alliance,
President Kabba announced that he would pursue a "two track approach" - fighting
the rebels while at the same time attempting to negotiate with them.327 With presidential election campaigns going on in Nigeria (and each presidential hopeful
promising to withdraw forces from Sierra Leone), the Malian contingent withdrawing to Freetown after suffering heavy losses in Port Loko, and the general weariness and fear on the part of neighboring leaders that the endless war was devastating the economies of their countries, pursuing peace seemed to be the only
available option for Kabba. 328 As for the AFRC/RUF alliance, the talks would present an opportunity to acquire freedom for its leaders, amnesty for war crimes and
legitimate political power through negotiation. 3 29 The RUF requested a "a negotiated settlement to the crisis in the country" in a letter dated May 12, 1998, sent to
Tony Blair, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, President Nelson Mandela of
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May 1999, at 18.
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South Africa, Konan Bedie of C6te d'Ivoire, and General Sani Abacha of Nigeria. 330 The talks,
held in Lomd, culminated in the signing of a peace agreement on
31
July 7, 1999. 1
The centerpiece of the Accord was the power-sharing arrangement between
the RUF and the government. 332 In the first place, the RUF was allowed to transform itself into a political party and its members allowed to hold public offices.333
Sankoh was appointed Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD), and was to
"enjoy the status of Vice President," answerable only to the President.334 The government also granted to the RUF one senior ministerial position, three other cabinet positions and four deputy ministerial posts. 335 As far as security issues were
concerned, the agreement recognized the role of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in monitoring the ceasefire.336 ECOWAS was
requested to revise ECOMOG's mandate to include peacekeeping, 337
security, protection of UNOMSIL, and disarmament/demobilization of personnel.
Human rights were dealt with as a post-conflict management issue. 338 In its
Preamble, the Accord noted the commitment of all the parties to the promotion and
respect of "human rights and humanitarian law. 339 In Article XXIV, the Accord
provided that:
The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system
and contained in the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the
UN and OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, shall be fully protected and promoted
within Sierra Leonean society.340
Particular emphasis was placed on the right to life and liberty, freedom from
torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association,
and the right to take part in the governance of the country. 34 1 A human rights
commission was established to address the grievances of the people in respect to
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343
alleged violations. 342 The commission was to function as a quasi-judicial organ.
The Accord did not specify its temporal mandate, but from the reading of the
agreement as whole, one gets the impression that the commission was intended to
deal with violations occurring after the signing of the Accord. 3 "

The Accord dealt with past human rights violations in two ways. 345 First, it
provided for a blanket amnesty against violations to members of the RUF and
other forces.346 As a condition precedent to the negotiation, Foday Sankoh was
pardoned of his past misdeeds. 347 The government was mandated in Article IX of
the Accord to "take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon. 348 Similarly, all combatants were granted reprieve against
any acts that they may have committed in "pursuit of their objectives up to the time
of signing of the agreement." 349 In order to promote peace and national reconciliation, the government committed itself to ensuring that no "official or judicial action" was taken against any member of RUF/SL, ex AFRC, ex SLA or CDF in respect of any of their actions prior to the signing of the agreement.35 ° The grant of
amnesty did not sit very well with the UN special representative present at the
meeting. 351 A handwritten disclaimer was attached to the final draft to the effect
that the UN interpretation of the amnesty clauses in the agreement did not include
"international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 352 International human
rights organizations openly criticized the grant of amnesty to the RUF and called
for justice.353 The United States and British governments supported the Accord.354
In their view, the Accord presented the most practical way of ending the fighting
and restoring democracy in Sierra Leone. 3"
Secondly, the Accord established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to
"deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra
Leonian Conflict in 1991.,,356 The Commission was to provide a forum in which
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victims and perpetrators alike would narrate their stories so as to promote national
reconciliation. 357 The Commission was expected to complete its work within
twelve months of its establishment and to prepare a report detailing its findings and
recommendations for government action. 358 The idea of a Truth Commission was
not a bad one. After all, they do provide ample opportunity for recording international crimes and allowing society to learn from "its past in order to prevent a repetition of such violence in the future., 359 However, they are a poor substitute for
prosecution because they are vulnerable to political manipulation and often parties
do not enjoy the full array of rights that a court proceeding may provide.360
The framework for peace drawn by the Lomd Accord had considerable shortcomings that became apparent immediately after it was signed. The organs upon
which the enterprise for peace was anchored were only loosely connected. Take,
for example, the Joint Implementation Committee (JIC).3 6 1 Apparently it was envisaged that the JIC, chaired by ECOWAS and comprised of the CCP and diplomatic representatives of the OAU, UN, and the Commonwealth, could oversee the
implementation of the Accord.362 Each of the members was a bureaucratic organization controlled from abroad.363 Their mandate in the Sierra Leone peace process
was part of a larger program of action drawn by their governing authorities. 3 4
Generally speaking, the JIC was comprised of independent organs each of which
pursued goals consistent with their interests.365 The UN function was mandated by
the Security Council while ECOMOG continued to get its command from the Nigerian authorities.366 Soon after the signing of the Accord, the roles of some of the
JIC member organs began to conflict.3 6 7 Similarly, financial resources were not
jointly shared. 368 The poorer organizations, especially those based in Sierra Leone,
were left incapable of making any meaningful contribution to the process.3 69 The
upshot of the matter was that the JIC could not function as a single unit, but rather
became a mouthpiece of the most financially endowed organizations.
The problem of implementing the Accord was compounded by the lack of political will to accommodate former rivals and work together towards the realization
of peace.370 As observed by Barbara Watter, a peace accord will succeed if "it
consolidates the previously warring factions into a single state" and creates a sys357. See Lome Agreement supra note 332, at art. XXVI(I).
358. See id.
359. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions 1974-1994: A ComparativeStudy in Transitional Justice, US INSTITUTE OF PEACE 220, 225 (1994).
360. See id.
361. See Lome Agreement, supra note 332, at art. XXXII.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See Barbara F. Watter, DesigningTtransitionFrom Civil War, 24 INT'L SECURITY 127, 133
(1999).
368. See id
369. See id.
370. See id.

2002

HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE

tem of government that will cater to the interests of all the parties. 371 The RUF
372
On
leadership refused even to acknowledge the role of the UN peacekeepers.
May 1,2000, RUF soldiers seized 500 UN peacekeepers and killed four of them.373
The RUF also continued to appropriate diamonds in complete disregard of Article
XX of the Accord.374 In February 2000, Sankoh was quoted as saying that the
RUF "was not going to give up diamonds or guns to anybody."3 75 With the RUF
refusing to meet their end of the bargain, the Kabba government opted to intensify
its military campaign against the rebels. 376 The British government supported the
move and sent thirteen hundred troops to Sierra Leone.377
As already mentioned, the Accord was not backed by adequate finances. In
any peace process, the availability of resources to compensate for the loss of income for former combatants, the revival of the economy, and the establishment of
infrastructure destroyed by the war is crucial to its success.378 John Darby calls it
the "peace dividend. 379 In the case of Sierra Leone, the international community
had pledged to give a total of £45 million. 380 The United Kingdom was to provide
£10 million of that amount. 38 ' According to Solomon Berewa, Kabba's Minister
for Justice, the international community had pledged the money in exchange for
the ministerial seats given to the RUF in the Lomd arrangements.382 Despite the
provisions for anti-poverty programs in the Accord, a proper framework for the
raising and management of funds was not laid out. 38 3 Reconstruction and general
development of institutions in the post-war period would require enormous financial intervention from the international community. 3 84 A cue should have been
taken from the Mozambiquean example where various international organizations,
including the UN, lobbied for the relaxation of fiscal commitments to the IMF.385
Despite their earlier defiance of the Accord, the RUF does not appear poised
to continue fighting.386 Though this augurs well for the peace initiatives, it does
not signify a quick end to the civil war. It may very well be that violence by the
splinter groups or renegade soldiers will not end until some successful arrangements for permanent peace are made. As matters now stand, a number of events

371.
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seemed to have worked against the RUF.387 First was the capture of Foday Sankoh
in May 2000.38 While many analysts had predicted the diminishing authority of
Sankoh as the acclaimed head of the RUF, his departure from the scene has demoralized many of his supporters and given voice to splinter groups hitherto unknown and unrepresented in the peace process. 389 The threat of his indictment for
war crimes has had a chilling effect on the organization military commanders and
affirmed the likelihood of the RUF loosing support among the international community if the war is not negotiated to an end.390
Second, the RUF connection with the Liberian leader Charles Taylor seems to
be under a lot of strain. 39' The relationship dates back to the days of the Liberian
civil war, when the RUF was formed by soldiers who had fought along side the
SPLF.392 During its campaign in Sierra Leone, Liberia acted as a clearinghouse for
all the diamonds illegally acquired. It was these diamonds that financially sustained RUF operations.393 The RUF soldiers also enjoyed sanctuary in Liberia
394
whenever they were escaping from the government or ECOMOG onslaught.
During the peace process, the United Nations, the US, and Britain put a lot of pressure on Charles Taylor to stop dealing Sierra Leone's diamonds. 395 Economic and
other sanctions were imposed on Liberia by the United Nations and other leading
world governments.396 For example, at the behest of Britain, the European Union
a key
blocked the $50 million grant to Liberia.397 To this end, Taylor became
39
player in persuading the RUF to participate in the Lom6 peace process. 8
Third, the military capacity of the forces fighting against the rebels had been
considerably revamped. 399 UNOMSIL, established by the UN Security Council in
June 1998, 40 0 received a further mandate in October 1999 to establish UNAMSIL
in its stead - a larger mission with 6,000 military personnel and 260 military ob-

387. See James Rupert, Rebels Free 180 More Hostages; Sierra Leonean President says RUF V
Chief will be put on Trial, WASH. POST, May 27 (2000) at AO1.
388. See id.
389. See id.
390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See Dickey supra note 376, at 9.
394. See William Reno, Failure of Peace Keeping in Sierra Leone, 100 CURRENT HISTORY 219,
222 (2000). In 2001,Taylor had allowed a RUF commander, Sam 'Maskita' Bockaire, to recruit fighters in Liberia. In October 1997, Taylor had detained an ECOMOG plane carrying South African mercenaries and 'Kamajor' fighters who were fighting against the military Junta. See Junta Versus Junta,
in 38 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Oct. 24, 1997 at 8.
395. See Reno, supra note 395, at 223.
396. See id.
397. See Francois Miser, Knives Out for Taylor, NEW AFR., Sept., 2000 at 11; see also Does Britain
Produce Diamonds, NEW AFR., Nov., 2000 at 28.
398. See Miser, supra note 398, at 10.
399. See id.
400. See U.N. SCOR, 4099th mtg. at 1270, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1270 (2000). Initially UNOMSIL was
to last for only six months. Special envoy Okelo of Uganda was named head of its operations by the UN
secretary-General. See id.
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servers.4 0 1 In February 2000, the Security Council, by its resolution 1289, further
revised the UNAMSIL mandate and expanded its military component to 11,100
persons. 2 In May 2000, a further increment to 13,000 was affected.40 3 To date,
there are about 17,500 military personnel under the UNAMSIL command.40 4
Apart from the UN, the British force's continued presence in Sierra Leone affirms
its government's commitment to the campaign against the RUF and other rebel
forces. 0 The announcement by Jonathan Riley, the British force commander in
Sierra Leone that, "we will leave when the war 40is6 either won or resolved in favorable terms" is an indication of this commitment.
Despite these developments, the disarmament process has not fully taken
place.40 7 Sporadic surrenders of weapons have been reported by UNAMSIL in
some parts of the country. 408 UNAMSIL continues to hold that it is implementing
the terms of the Lomd Accord.4 0 9 Kabba, on the other hand, maintains that his
hold on power is based on the constitution.' 0
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO PEACE
Understandingthe Human Rights - Peace Nexus
The concept of human rights encapsulates notions ofjustice and fairness to all
humans. They are the benefits that are deemed essential for the individual's well
being, dignity, and fulfilment and that reflect a common sense of justice, fairness
and decency. Human rights evolved from the concept of "natural rights" and the
"rights of man," both of which have their origins in the pre-modern natural law
doctrines of Greek stoicism.4 1 ' Natural law was seen as the embodiment of duties
imposed upon society by God.412 These duties were to become the natural rights of
persons. 1 3 The belief that there was a higher law superior to the law of humans
later became associated with liberal theories and natural rights. 414 After the Middle
Ages, these ideas fermented resistance to religious intolerance and political oppression. 415 Notions of freedom and equality became pervasive not only within
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the realm of politics but also with regard to the use and ownership of property.
However, political commitment to human rights came only after the First
World War.4' 7 The Peace Conference held after this war established a Labor
Commission under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, the President of the American Federation of Labor.4 18 It was this Commission that drafted the first Charter
establishing the present day International Labor Organization (ILO). 4 19 Amongst
the underlying principles that informed this Charter's formulation was that of social justice _42o that it would not be possible to achieve sustainable peace unless the
rights of working men, women, and children were protected. 421 After the Second
World War, the nations of the world, desiring to put an end to further wars, established the United Nations and enacted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).422 It not only incorporated several of those rights contained in the ILO
document, but also decreed that the rights were to be enjoyed by everyone "without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion political or
other opinion or social origin property, birth or other status., 423 The UDHR is the
424
force behind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights (ICSCR),425 the three
See Weston, supra note 411, at 259.
See id.
See id.
See generally, E.A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY
YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (2d" ed., 1995); see also Thomas Wolf, ILO Experience in Implementation of Human Rights, 10 J. INT'L L. ECON. 599 (1975); Jean-Michel Servais, ILO Standards on Freedom of Association and their Implementation, 123 INT'L LAB. REV. 765 (1984); N. VALITICOS & G.
VON POTOBSKY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW (2d ed. 1995).
420. See generally, WILFRED JENKS, HUMAN RIGHTS, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PEACE: THE BROADER
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE I.L.O. EXPERIENCE 21 (1968); WILFRED JENKS, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LAW OF
416.
417.
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421. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948),
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm. [hereinafter UNDHR]. This was the
embodiment of the principals contained in the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, which was incorporated into the ILO constitution in 1946. See id. art. 1. The Declaration reemphasized the belief on the
observance of the right of "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex.. to pursue their material well being... in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and economic opportunity"
and further that "the attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of national and international policy." See id. at Annex. It also affirmed the ILO principles that
labor is not a commodity; that freedom of association are essential to sustained progress; and that poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere. See UNDHR.
422. See UNDHR, supra note 421.; see also U.N. Centre for Human Rights, Human Rights: A
Compilation of International Instruments, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/l/Rev. 5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.l
(1994) available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/BIBLIO.htm. The UNDHR is a declaration
of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted in Paris France, on December 10, 1948, the date that has
been subsequently proclaimed as the human rights day of the United Nations and it is annually celebrated as such. See id at preamble See generally NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL
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423. UNDHR, supra note 421, at art. 2, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/
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of them comprising what can be termed the "International Bill of Rights."
The dynamism of the international community has inspired the adoption of
many treaties in the field of human rights and it may not be feasible to discuss all
of them in this paper. It should, however, be mentioned here that international regimes currently define human rights as comprising civil and political rights on the
one hand and social and economic rights on the other, thus creating the erroneous
impression that some rights are more important than others.426 Human rights are
interrelated, indivisible, and highly interdependent; the so-called civil and political
rights are just as important and urgent as the social, economic, and cultural
rights.427
The juridical conception of human rights provides an amiable avenue through
which states may minimize if not completely eliminate the causes of internal conflicts. Civil and political rights guarantees, as contained in the ICCPR, encapsulate
norms basic to any democratic practice which ensure generic standards of nondiscrimination in all spheres of life. 428 For example, the right to free speech under
Article 19(1) of ICCPR emphasizes that "everyone shall have the right to hold
opinion without interference., 429 Free speech is central to democratic governance,
which in turn influences the attainment of peace or reduction of political violence.
Economic and social rights address issues of human welfare that are a precondition
for the enjoyment of life in dignity and for the harmonious and non-violent development of national and international society.
In 1984, the UN General Assembly made a declaration on the right of people
to peace. 430 Though made largely in reaction to the threat of nuclear war, it equally
befits the current spate of internal conflicts. 3' In its Preamble it expresses "the
will and the aspiration of all people to eradicate war from life of mankind and,
above all, to avert a world wide nuclear catastrophe. 432 The Annex states that
each State;
[s]olemnly proclaims that the peoples of our planet have the sacred right to
peace;... [e]mphasizes that ensuring the exercise of the right of peoples to peace
demands that the policies of the States be directed towards the elimination of the
threat of war, particularly nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means
on the basis of the Charter of the UN. 3

GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.
426. See ICESCR.
427. See id.
428. See ICCPR, supra note 4, at 52.
429. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19; see also ICESCR, supra note 425, at art. 19(2) (providing for
the right to freedom of expression).
430. See U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 57th mtg, Doc. A/Res/39/11
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The desire for peace runs through the entire spectrum of international human
rights regimes.434 The Human Rights Committee, while commenting on the right
to life, has observed:
It is a right which should not be interpreted narrowly. . The committee observes
that war and other acts of mass violence continue to be a scourge of humanity and
take the lives of thousands of innocent human beings every year.. .The committee
considers that States have the supreme duty to prevent wars, acts of genocide and
other acts of mass violence causing arbitrary loss of life. Every effort they make
to avert danger of war, especially thermonuclear war, and to strengthen international peace and security would constitute the most important condition and guarantee for the safeguarding of the right to life.435
In all, a vast body of legal norms establishes a veritable human rights code
that gives meaning to the phrase "human rights and fundamental freedoms" and
clarifies the obligations of member states imposed by the UN Charter.436 Today,
despite any controversies in which the concept of human rights may be enmeshed,437 it is generally accepted that human rights are universal: they are inalienable and inherent birthrights that are due and applicable to every human being
in any society regardless of any distinction.438
Human Rights Question in the SierraLeone Civil War
The greatest tragedy of the Sierra Leone civil war is the widespread violations
of human rights.439 It is estimated that since 1991, over 20,000 Sierra Leonians
have been killed as a result of the civil war and more than one third of the popula434. See U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 57th mtg, Doc. A/Res/39/ll1
pher://gopherl .un.org/00/ga/recs/39/1 1.
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tion of 4.5 million people have been displaced. 440 There is no question that human
rights violations, as defined by international law, have characterized the RUF campaign against the government forces since 1911 when it first began its operations. 44 1 Analysts agree that the intensity of violations increased after the May 25
coup that ousted President Kabba and brought to power the AFRC/RUF coalition.442 The military junta that assumed power suspended the constitution and
established a Kangaroo court system - the Peoples Revolutionary courts manned
by civilians - to supplement the Military courts." 3 The situation was no doubt
exacerbated by the confrontation between the AFRC/RUF and the Nigerian-led
ECOMOG forces. 4" Human Rights Watch has summarized it as follows:
The rebel occupation of Freetown was characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of gross human rights abuses against the civilian
population. Civilians were gunned down within their houses, rounded up and
massacred on the streets, thrown from upper floors of buildings, used as human
shields, and burned alive in cars and houses. They had their limbs hacked off with
machetes, eyes gouged out with knives, hands smashed with hammers, and bodies
burned with boiling water. Women and girls were systematically
sexually abused
445
and children and young people abducted by hundreds.
But atrocities in the Sierra Leone civil war have not been limited to rebel activity."

6

The mercenary forces, Nigerian led ECOMOG forces, Kamajors, 44 7 and

the government forces have been equally guilty of violations.4 48 The South African mercenary outfit EO was reputed for putting land mines in diamond mining
areas to deter unauthorized mining." 9 On October 19, 1998, the Nigerian
ECOMOG soldiers executed twenty-four army officers, including former chief-ofstaff Conteh and Colonel SFY Koroma, who had been convicted by a military tribunal but denied the right to appeal.4 50 A Human Rights Watch report has criticized the shelling of civilian areas by ECOMOG in 1996 and also castigated the
Kamajors for killings, torture, and the obstruction of humanitarian assistance.45 ' In
a 1999 report, Human Rights Watch documented the spate of executions carried
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446. See id.
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and courage, necessary for ensuring safety of their locality from the intrusion of the rebels. See id.
448. See id.
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out by the joint ECOMOG, CDF, and Kamajor militias. 52 The report points to the
difficulty of ascertaining whether the ECOMOG high command was aware of
these activities.453 It is likely that this was so because the executions were usually
carried out in public places and in front of large crowds.454 In February 1999, the
UN released a report in which it blamed ECOMOG for summarily executing rebels
when about forty
and their sympathizers. 455 The report singled out one occasion 456
people were executed and their bodies disposed of by ECOMOG.
Human rights violations in the Sierra Leone civil war are a reflection of the
emerging trends in modem warfare - what has been termed the "wars of the third
kind. 457 Looked at in this context, the violations are more than just the "flagrant
disobedience of legal norms," but a product of an acculturation process that defines
the means through which groups assert their needs. 58 Unfortunately, international
law and the institutions that foster it are not equipped to deal with sociological
problems which give rise to discordant and culpable actions/omissions, and therefore are non-suited to remedy complexities that such sociological trends engender.459 But the overwhelming desire to do something about the conduct of war
which causes such widespread human suffering has led to the recognition that certain kinds of activities may be categorized as international crimes, including genocide,460 war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 46' This development has sig-
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cultural evolution. See id. at 36.
458. David J. Scheffer, The InternationalCriminal TribunalForward: Deterrence of War Crimes
'
in the 21 Century, 23 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 2 (1999). Acknowledging these changes, the US
Ambassador at large for war crimes, David J. Scheffer, while addressing the Intemational Military Operations and Law Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii on February 23, 1999, observed that, "conventional
warfare has been transformed in our lifetimes. Armed conflict has become increasingly identified not
with clash of armies across sovereign borders, or between 'isms,' but with the assault by government
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459. See id.
460. See Genocide Convention G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, at art. 2 (1948), available at
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naled a further erosion of state sovereignty principles 462 and called for the expansion of international mechanisms for ensuring the full operation of law in circumstances of both internal and international conflicts.
As already adumbrated, the development of conventional international law to
cover civil war situations has not been complemented by effective enforcement
machinery at the international level. 463 Therefore, the problem is not the lack of
law, "but how this law can be applied in the absence of enforcement provisions.
The UN Security Council has attempted to fill this vacuum by creating ad hoc international criminal tribunals. 465 Under Article 39 of the UN Charter, 46 the Security Council has power to determine whether any action or activity poses a threat to
world peace and to make a recommendation in accordance with Article 41 and
42.
It is undisputed that internal civil wars such as the one in Sierra Leone
threaten world peace. 468 The question remains as to whether the ad hoc tribunals
do help to bring about peace.
The Politics ofAD HOC InternationalCriminal Tribunals
470
469
The ad hoc war crimes tribunals began with the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals that were set up after World War II to try war criminals. Since then, the
UN Security Council has established two other tribunals, the Yugoslavia and the
Rwanda tribunals. 471 The process for the establishment of the fourth tribunal in

killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily harm... (c) deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.. .(d) imposing measures intended to
prevent births.. and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group).
461. See Genocide Convention G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, at art. 2 (1948).
462. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/
contents.html (asserting that the doctrine of state sovereignty militates against the intrusion into matters
that occur within the territorial borders of any state). Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter excludes any UN action in "matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state." See U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 7
463. See David Turns, War Crimes Without War? The Applicability of InternationalHumanitarian
Law to Atrocities in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 7 AFR. J. INT'L COMP. L. 804, 805 (1995).
464. Id.
465. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 464, at art. 39.
466. See id.
467. See id.
468. See InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment in
Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, and DissentingOpinion (Applicability of the Grave Breaches Provisions of
the Geneva Convention of 1949; Laws of War; Crimes Against Humanity, 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997).
469. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284.
470. See The International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, established by Charter of
the International Military Tribunal for Far east at Tokyo (1946), Special Proclamation by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, TIAS No 1589, reprinted in 4 Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 27 (1946). The tribunal was established by an executive order of General Douglas McArthur and not by the multilateral treaty. He also appointed the
judges and the prosecutor for the tribunal. See id.
471. See Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a PermanentInternationalCriminalCourt, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11,14 (1997).
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Sierra Leone has just begun.472
It was the revulsion against the atrocities committed by the Nazis during the
war and the desire to rid the world of any such calamity in the future that inspired a
major political campaign for the establishment of some form of judicial institution
to try and punish war offenders.473 The promulgation of the Nuremberg Charter
and the establishment of the tribunal was the culmination of an ages-long quest for
international action against violations of the rules of war.47 4 The unsuccessful attempts to prosecute German military personnel pursuant to the Treaty of Ver4 76
sailles, 475 and the very mediocre trials at Leipzig by the German Supreme Court
after World War I, evaporated hopes of establishing an international justice system
free from political subjugation. The defeat of Germany by the Allied powers provided an opportunity in which Germany's military aggression and the heinous
conduct of some of its military officers could be put to trial.477 Indeed, when the
four Allied powers met on August 8, 1945, an agreement for the prosecution and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis was made. 478 A
Charter was also drawn creating an international tribunal with jurisdiction to try
crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.479
The anachronism of applying international law to non-state actors (established
by the Nuremberg process), while seeking individual accountability for crimes of
war has become a benchmark for the enforcement of international human rights
law. 480 The process has, however, generated a fair share of criticism. To some observers, the symbolism of Nuremberg remains as an affirmation of the complete

472. See Bassiouni, supra note 471, at 14.
473. See idat 11-12.
474. See id. at 20.
475. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, concluded at Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43.
476. See Bassiouni, supra note 471, at 20.
477. See id. at 25.
478. See id. Article 6 provided as follows: The Tribunal established by the agreement referred to in
article I hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European axis countries
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
War crimes: namely violations of custom of war.
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war,
or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of a country where perpetrated. Id.
481. See id.
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defeat of Germany by the Allied powers, rather than the triumph of international
law over abhorrent conduct of war.48 ' Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone of the US
Supreme Court observed:
So far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the application of the power
of the victor to the vanquished because the vanquished made aggressive war... I
dislike extremely to see it dressed up with false faqade of legality. The best that
can be said for it is that it is a political act of the victorious states which may be
morally right.482
Recently, the tribunal has been described as "a patchwork of political convenience, the arrogance of military victory over defeat, and the ascendancy of American, Anglo-Saxon hegemony over the globe. 483 Viewed against the opposition to
the establishment of a permanent court by the United States and others,484 such
criticisms are not misplaced, Moreover, time and again, the idiosyncrasies of
moral superiority professed by powerful nations have never been translated into an
articulate program of rescue, especially when calamity strikes in poor nations of
the south.48 5 The tribunals have thus been seen as a mere apologia for the international community's inaction in situations of flagrant human rights abuses.

486

The

Rwandan case is perhaps the best example in this regard. On April 21, 1994, just
when the genocide was beginning, the United Nations passed a resolution that reduced its peacekeeping force to a paltry two hundred and seventy persons.48 7 According to one observer, the apparent lack of interest in the Rwandan genocide
"can be attributed single-handedly to the United States.

' 488

Since the debacle in

Somali, the United States has been keen to avoid any involvement in peacekeeping
operations in Africa.489 Congress had in this regard drafted Presidential Decision
Directive 25, urging that "the US should persuade others not to undertake the missions it wished to avoid. 49 °
No matter the perception, the Nuremberg process established a legacy that
was followed in Tokyo and most recently in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 491 Lessons

from these tribunals reveal a litany of conceptual and structural difficulties, thus

481. See Bassiouni, supra note 471, at 25.
482. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 715 (1956).

483. M. Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and the Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167, 170 (1997).
484. See Robert Johansen, US Opposition to the International Criminal Court: Unfounded Fears,
Policy Brief, No. 7, JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

STUDIES, NOTRE DAME

(2001), available at http://www.nd.edu/-krocinst/polbriefs/pbrief7.html. According to Johansen, "the
reason for US opposition is simple. All the temporary tribunals that the US has supported were limited
to investigating others; they would not hold US citizens accountable." Id.
485. See id.
486. See Nehal Bhuta, Paved With Good Intentions- HumanitarianWar, The New Interventionism
and Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 25 MELB. U.L. REv. 843, 858 (2001).
487. See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49" Sess., 3368 a' mtg. P 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (1994).
488. MANNING, supra note 130, at 150.
489. See id.
490. Id.
491. See id.

DENV. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 30:3

relegating their significance to mere acknowledgement of the necessity for a more
robust system of legal intervention. 92 Secondly, they have been bedevilled 4by93
lack of finances, impacting negatively in their pursuit of witnesses and staffing.
Thirdly, pure logistical problems of apprehending culprits have not been resolved.
For example, while the arraignment of Milosevic before The Hague tribunal is
commendable, known perpetrators of the massacre at Suva Reka in southern Kosovo are still at large.494
From a more ideological standpoint, some nations have opposed the creation
of these tribunals because the permanent members of the Security Council can use
them to insulate themselves and their allies from investigation. 495 When the Security Council debated the establishment of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals,
China expressed fear that the tribunals may set precedent for the creation of yet
another tribunal.496 The prediction has indeed come true with the now proposed
Sierra Leone Court. Questions have also arisen as to why tribunals should be created in certain cases and not in others.497 The hue against "tribunal fatigue" impacted rather positively on the movement towards the creation of a permanent
498
court.
The feeling that the process of establishing a tribunal is slow and expensive has added impetus to claims that a permanent institution is probably what the
world needs.499
The "SpecialCourt"for Sierra Leone
On August 14, 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously voted for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone. 50 0 After the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals, this will be the third tribunal created in two decades to deal with
war crimes. 501 Unlike the Rwandan tribunal, the resolution for the establishment
of this tribunal was fully supported by the Sierra Leone government. 50 2 Indeed, it

492. See MANNING, supranote 130, at 150.
493. See id.
494 See Roy Gutman and Rod Nordland, Yugoslavia: A Massacre and the Case Against Milosevic,
NEWSWEEK 34-38, Jun. 23, 2001.
495. See Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent InternationalCourt: The Obstacles to Independence
and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 298 (1998).
496. See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 200 (1995). China abstained from voting on Security
Council Resolution 955 establishing the Rwanda Tribunal. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 11 (1994).
497. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complimentarity: Reconciling the Jurisdictionof National
Courts andInternationalCriminalTribunals,23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 386 (1998).
498. See id
499. See id.
500. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
501. See id The Yugoslavia tribunal was set up in May 1993 as a reaction to the crimes committed
during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. The Rwanda tribunal, set
up in November 1994, was a response to large-scale massacres of the Tutsis by Hutus immediately after
the killing of the Rwanda president Juvenal Habriyimana. See id.
502. See Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, CurrentApathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special
Court ForSierraLeone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 404 (2001).
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was the request made by President Ahmad Tejan Kabba of Sierra Leone to Secretary General Kofi Annan in June 2000 that ignited the UN process. 50 3 The government of Sierra Leone sought international assistance in establishing a special
court to try members of Foday Sankoh's RUF.5 4 A court created by the United
Nations, Kabba had stated, would "have the advantage of strong enforcement powers that will call for cooperation from states in the investigations, arrest, extradition
and the enforcement of sentence. 5 °5
The proposed tribunal is set to try "crimes against humanity, war crimes and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law as well as crimes under
relevant Sierra Leone law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone. 50 6 The
special court will have jurisdiction to try persons who have the greatest responsibility for the commission of such crimes.50 7 As a follow-up procedure to Resolution 1315, the Security Council authorized the Secretary General to commence
consultation with the Sierra Leone government with a view to setting out recommendations as to the court's jurisdiction, its appellate procedures, and matters relating to its physical location. 0 8
In October 2000, the Secretary General presented his report to the Security
Council. 50 9 According to this report, the special court in Sierra Leone will not be
anything close to the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals, but will instead be a
hybrid tribunal whose composition and general mandate, while remaining specific
to the circumstances of Sierra Leone, may come directly under the control of the
Kabba government. 510 The Sierra Leone government will be allowed to appoint
one judge each for the two trial chambers and two judges in the appeals chamber. 51' Secondly, unlike the Rwanda and the Yugoslavia tribunals, the special
court in Sierra Leone will be constituted out of an agreement between the UN and
the government of Sierra Leone.51 2 The court will thus have concurrent jurisdic-

503. See Fritz, supra 502, at 400.
504. See generally id.
505. Barbara Crossette, SierraLeone Asks UNfor Role in War Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 21, 2000.
The British and US government supported the move though not exactly on the same terms. The US was
initially opposed to the idea of a UN tribunal akin to Yugoslavia and Rwanda, asserting that the process
of establishing such a tribunal may take a long time. See id. It nevertheless supported the creation of
some kind of"international war crime umbrella to cover these odious people." Id. The British, on the
other hand, supported the proposal by Kabba for a hybrid court which would be under the control of
Sierra Leone government, would try members of the RUF, would apply international law as well as
Sierra Leone law, and would enjoy monetary support of the UN Trust Fund. See id. Both countries
were able to garner international support for the establishment of the tribunal. See id.
506. U.N. SCOR, supra note 500.
507. Draft Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(I), available at
http://www.specialcourt.org/ documents/statute.html (last visited March 12, 2002).
508. See U.N. SCOR, supra note 500, at para. 7.
509. See Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1055 (2000) at 34.
510. See Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1055 (2000) at 34.
511. See Draft Statute, supra note 507, at art. 12(l)(a).
512. See id. at preamble.
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tion and even primacy over the local courts in Sierra Leone, but will lack "power
to assert its primacy over national courts in third states in connection with crimes
committed in Sierra Leone." 513 Similarly, the court will lack the power to "request
the surrender of suspects from any third states" or to "induce the compliance of its
authorities with any such request."5 14 The fact that the court will have jurisdiction
to try offences under the domestic law lends credence to its diminished international character; the possibility of manipulation by the government of Sierra
Leone, to ensure the incarceration of its political rivals, cannot be ruled out. 5"
The court will only deal with crimes committed after November 30, 1996.'16
The narrow temporal jurisdiction of the court may limit its ability to deal effectively with crimes committed throughout the civil war. Since the war begun in
1991, the level of involvement of the various personalities may have changed.
Foday Sankoh, the proclaimed leader of the RUF, having been out of prison for
only 4 months after November 1996, may escape prosecution for crimes committed before that time. Setting the temporal jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals has always been controversial. When the Rwanda tribunal was set up, the
Security Council limited its jurisdiction to the period between January 1, 1994 and
December 31, 1994. 17 The government voted against the resolution and sought an
amendment to extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal to cover the entire period of
the civil war, arguing that the genocide committed in 1994 was the result of "a
long period of planning" and that the refusal of the international tribunal to take
account of such planning may be disastrous
towards the process of creating a cli518
mate conducive for national reconciliation.
The argument that stretching the jurisdiction to cover the entire period of the
war may overburden the court is not plausible enough to allay fears that the court
is representative of the international community's lukewarm response to African
problems. 51 9 Indeed, such a stance is consistent with the United States policy towards Sierra Leone, which has advocated all along for negotiations with the RUF,
despite the poor human rights record of the latter. 520 Moreover the idea that the
United Nations, and indeed the international community, may not be prepared to
take the full burden of dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity sends
a wrong signal and slows down the momentum towards the support for the international criminal court.
The above notwithstanding, the establishment of a special court affirms the

513. Draft Statute, supra note 507, at art. 12(1)(a).
514. Id.

515. See id.
516. See Diane Marie Amann, Message as Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
237, 244 (2001).
517. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (with annexed Statute). See also Payam Akhavan, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmaticsof Punishment,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996).
518. See U.N. SCOR, supra note 496.
519. See U.N. SCOR, supra note 496.
520. See id.
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international community's revulsion against war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and the general abuse of human rights. The constitutive statute sets out the legal
competence of the court to deal with four sets of crimes, namely, crimes against
viohumanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, serious
law. 5 2 1
lations of international humanitarian law, and crimes under Sierra Leone
(a)

Crimes Against Humanity

According to Article 2 of the statute, the special court shall have the power to
prosecute crimes against humanity. 522 These crimes are specified as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence,
persecution on political racial, ethnic or religious grounds, and other inhumane
acts.523 The acts that constitute crimes against humanity have their origins in the
Nuremberg Charter.524 Since then, rape and torture have been added to the list by
the Yugoslav Statute. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC)5 25 has added to the list the enforced disappearance of persons and crime of
are committed against civilapartheid. Such acts will constitute the offense if they
526
ian population and are "widespread or systematic.
(b) Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II
The Geneva Conventions are an embodiment of a set of rules guiding humanitarian action in armed conflict situations. Central to the Conventions is the princi527
ple that persons not actively involved in warfare should be treated humanely.
Common Article 3 introduces the application of this principle to "armed conflicts
not of an international character"5' 28 and sets out minimum guarantees for the pro-

521. See S.C. Res. 955, supranote 517.
522. See id.
523. See id.
524. See id. at art. 6.
525. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9
(1998) [hereinafter ICC Treaty].
526. Id. at art. 7.
527. See id.
528. Id. at art. 3. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akeyesu, the ICTR observed that an armed conflict
may be said to exist "whenever there is.. protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized groups or between such groups within a state." See International Criminal tribunal for
Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sept. 2, quoted in Babafemi Akinrinade, "International Humanitarian
Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone", LLM University of Notre Dame Law School Thesis 2000, at 32.
Note, however, that by virtue of Article 1(4) of Protocol 1, 1977, armed conflict of an international
character is defined to include wars against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes.
See David P. Forsyth, Legal Management of International War, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 272 (1978). Noninternational conflicts, on the other hand, may be difficult to define. They may range from full-scale
civil wars to relatively minor disturbances. Article I of Protocol il prevents the application of its provisions from internal unrest including "riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature as not being armed conflicts." Id.
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tection of non-combatants, providing in pertinent part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflicts shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded 5on
race, colour, religion or
29
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
The article delineates acts that are prohibited to include murder, torture, mutilation and all forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, the taking of hostages, humiliating and degrading treatment, and the passing of sentences and carrying out
executions without due process. 30 Protocol II reaffirms the rules set out in Common Article 3 and expands the protection to include prohibitions against slavery,
pillage, rape, and acts of terrorism, as well as the threat to commit such acts.53'
The statute of the Special Court draws from the Convention to create offenses that
the court will have jurisdiction to try. 532 In Article 3, the following offenses are
listed: violence to life including murder and cruel treatment, collective punishments, the taking of hostages, terrorism, rape, indecent assault and other forms of
degrading punishments, pillage, the passing of sentences and executions without
recourse33to court and judicial guarantees, as well as threats to commit those of5
fences.
The Sierra Leone Special Court statute adopts the innovation created by the
Rwanda statute where, for the first time, the UN Security Council criminalized
breaches against the Geneva Convention. 534 Generally speaking, breaches to the
provisions of Common Article 3 and the additional Protocol II do not attract penal
sanctions unless individual member states enact such provisions into their domestic
criminal legislation. 535 Questions thus arose as to whether the inclusion of Common Article 3 and the additional Protocol II provisions into the statute of the
Rwanda tribunal established individual criminal responsibility of the violators.536
In his report on the Rwanda tribunal, the UN Secretary General noted that the Security Council had adopted a more expansive approach to the subject matter juris-

529. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Article 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
530. See id
531. See id. at art. 4
532. See id.
533. See id.
534. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
554, 558 (1995).
535. See id.
536. See Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security Council Tribunal into Rwanda Crisis, in 32 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 329 (1997).
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diction of the tribunal and thus included in the treaty "international instruments regardless of whether they were considered part of customary international law or
whether they have customarily entailed individual criminal responsibility of the
perpetrator of the crime." ' " No scholar less venerable than Theodore Meron has
asserted that since Nuremberg, there has never been any doubt that certain kinds of
conduct, violating norms of international order as it were, should attract individual
criminal sanctions.5 38 To determine which kinds of conduct should be considered
for such sanctions, he suggests that the test should be as follows:
Whether international law creates criminal responsibility depends on such considerations as whether the prohibitory norm in question, which may be conventional
or customary, is directed to individuals, states, groups or other authorities, and/or
to all these. The extent to which the prohibition is addressed to individuals,
whether the prohibition is unequivocal in character, the gravity of the act, and the
interests of the international
community are all relevant factors in determining the
5 39
criminality of various acts.
Like the Rwanda statute, the Sierra Leone statute has specifically affirmed
that persons who plan, instigate, order, commit, aid and abet in the planning or
execution of crimes provided for under the statute will bear individual criminal responsibility. 540 The statute does not absolve actions carried out in official capacity,
nor does it grant reprieve to superiors for actions committed by their subordinates,
provided that such superior
knew of the acts and never took any reasonable step to
54 1
prevent or stop them.
(c)

Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Apart from the Geneva Conventions, the Special Court has been accorded jurisdiction to try several other breaches against humanitarian law, including deliberate attacks on civilians and humanitarian personnel, installations, materials, or vehicles involved in "humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions.',5 4 The
inclusion of these acts into the category of international crimes to be tried by the
court is largely a reaction to the rampant incursions against peacekeeping and humanitarian activities by soldiers of the RUF, which have variously been reported as
holding UN peacekeepers hostage, confiscating their weapons, and even killing
them. 543 Also included in this category is the offence544of abduction and forced recruitment of children below age 15 into armed forces.

537. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955,
U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 134th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995) at para. 12.
538. See Meron, supra note 534, at 554.
539. See id. at 562.
540. See Draft Statute, supra note 507, at art. 6.
541. See id. at art. 6(2)-(3).
542 See id at art. 4(b).
543. See id.
544. See id. at art. 4(c).
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(d)

Crimes Under Sierra Leone Law

The only Sierra Leone offenses over which the court will exercise jurisdiction
are those created under sections six, seven, and twelve of the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children Act of 1926 (Chapter 31 of the Laws of Sierra Leone)5

45

and section

two, five, and six of the Malicious Damages Act of 1861.546 The first set of offenses relates to the abuse and abduction of girls below the age of fourteen, while
the second set includes prohibitions against wanton destruction of property (particularly buildings)., 47
Problems and Prospects
On passing the resolution establishing the court, the Security Council acknowledged that the civil war in Sierra Leone was indeed a threat to international
peace and security in terms of Article 39 of the UN Charter, thus necessitating action under Chapter VII of the Charter. 548 The establishment of the court may indeed be a milestone towards ensuring international justice, but whether it may influence the resolution of the ongoing civil strife in that country and other regions in
Africa is a matter that is open to debate. When the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals were set up the proclaimed purpose was to "put an end" to unconscionable
violations of human rights and to bring the perpetrators of such violations to justice.549 Clearly the purpose of the intended tribunal in Sierra Leone is not different, except that in this case, the war has not ended. The question to ask is whether
the commitment to punish human rights violations and war crimes is matched by
an appropriate interventionist program capable of ending hostilities and restoring
complete democracy.
The United Nations, as a world government, is often faced with restricted
choices in view of the legal construction of its mandate. In the first place, its jurisdiction extends over states, not individuals.5 5 0 Second, the bureaucracy inherent in
its internal structure and the consensual prerequisites in all its decision-making
processes often diminishes its ability to make a timely response to any issue.55,
Treaties take ages to ratify, appointments face immeasurable political hurdles, and
finances are perpetually unavailable. Be that as it may, the UN has attempted to
make some contribution to the process of conflict resolution in almost all parts of
the world, including peacekeeping initiatives such as those in Kosovo, Rwanda,
Angola, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Congo, and including refugee assistance,
election monitoring and other humanitarian programs just to mention a few.552 But
these initiatives have more often than not been a patchwork of uncoordinated activ545.
546.
547.
548.

See Draft Statute, supra note 507, at art. 5(a).
See id. at art. 5(b).
See id. at art. 4-5.
See id.

549. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).

550. See id.
551. See id.
552. See id.
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ity mandated by Security Council Resolutions. The UN has never been in the habit
of laying down a five or ten-year conflict resolution action plan in respect to each
conflict situation in which it chooses to become involved. The result has been disastrous. The ad hoc measures often resorted to end up prolonging the conflict instead of remedying it. The debacle in Somali and the now ended civil war in Liberia are good examples. Somali is now a "failed state" while the Liberia civil war
took seven years to resolve. 553 In cases where the UN has chosen to get involved
after a civil war, it has most certainly rewarded the victors with political support
and assisted in the punishment of the losers.
In either case, human rights are treated as a separate agenda and are never integrated into the economic and other humanitarian programs undertaken by the UN
and its collaborators. In almost all cases where ad hoc tribunals have been created,
the violation of human rights is treated as unconnected to other aspects of societal
life. The tribunals function as mechanical vehicles for punishing acts committed
within a set period, without enjoying any flexibility at all, and thus cannot adjust
their mandates to deal with new circumstances as they arise. The Rwanda tribunal
now sitting in Arusha does not have the mandate to try Tutsi militias who massacred Hutus living in refugee camps after 1994 - yet these cases were widely reported.554 The tribunal raisond'etre notwithstanding, the general perception that it
supports the Tutsi-led regime in Rwanda tampers its stature as an impartial organ
of international justice.
In Sierra Leone, similar questions arise. How impartial will the court be considering that the Kabba government is taking part in the creation and appointment
of judges? Given that the government sponsored militia - Kamajors, ECOMOG,
international mercenary groups, and even government soldiers - have committed
some form of human rights violations," 5 what is the likelihood that they may face
trial? Since the war is still going on, the consequences of the court, if established,
may be different but probably more calamitous. In the first place, it will diminish
any chances of getting the belligerents to comply with the Lomd Accord, especially the disarmament provisions which are currently being enforced by
UNAMSIL. Obviously everybody will fear arrest and prosecution. Second, it may
legitimize the Kabba government despite the government's ineffectiveness. Third,
it may create an aura of political uncertainty as belligerents may scheme for complete victory in the civil war to avoid prosecution. It is perhaps because of these
reasons that most processes, for example the Northern Ireland peace process and
even the South African negotiated transition, begin with a blanket declaration of
amnesties for past violations.556 For Sierra Leone, much effort should be directed
towards the complete cessation of hostilities and the restoration of democracy.
Thereafter, seeking justice becomes a natural component to the process of societal
healing and reconstruction.

553. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
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555. See Juma, supra note 82, at 86.
556. See Lemarchand, supra note 215, at 581.
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Whereas human rights regimes define an important constituency in the foray
of conflict resolution processes, the methods of its enforcement have remained too
restricted. Violations of human rights, such as those witnessed in Sierra Leone,
demand much more than an ad hoc war crimes tribunal with a restricted mandate.
The argument could have been different if, at the time the war began, there was an
international criminal court exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. The approach,
therefore, favors the establishment of a permanent international court capable of
exercising a wide jurisdiction, supervising regimes and institutions whose conduct
is found wanting, and, above all, of establishing linkages with other forums working towards peace. The permanency will allow for long-term planning and integration, obviate naivety in the whole process of determining the culpability of an insurgency, and may keep governments warned of the consequences of their
indiscretion. In the words of Bassiouni:
The ICC is the most appropriate international mechanism through which the proscriptive norms against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes can become more effective instrumental norms as opposed to being essentially
557 the embodiment of intrinsic values reflecting international social expectation.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have traced the political developments of Sierra Leone since
independence. I have demonstrated that the civil war that began in 1991 did not
occur in a vacuum, but was the culmination of the process of decay enunciated by
poor leadership from the time of Sir Milton Magai to the present. In the trajectory,
different factors, some inextricably intertwined with the cultural and sociological
milieu in which the country found itself, have emerged to explain why the intractable civil war has survived to this day. I have argued that the international response
to this conflict must take cognizance of these factors. Indications give little hope
that the UN or its collaborators will do so. The proposed war crimes tribunal is
probably not the best strategy for resolving the war at this point in time. Designing
a more integrated plan capable of dealing with all the poignant issues of the Sierra
Leone civil war may be a good starting point. The plan should address issues of
economic disparity and ethno-political contests and should help Sierra Leonians
build a true democratic society capable of nurturing good political leadership and
respect for human rights.
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